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1ST 

^ Tactics and Technique 

of Cavalry 



THE GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS 
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 

192 1 





THE GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS PRESS 
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 



1921 




Glass ULc- 15* 



Book_ 






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Tactics and Technique 
of Cavalry 



a. 

THE ^GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS 
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 

19 2 1 




THE GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS PRESS 
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 



192 1 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Pages 

Chapter I. — Role of Cavalry 7 

Chapter II. — Reconnaissance 18 

Chapter III. — Advance Guards, Rear Guards and Ousposts 34 

Chapter IV. — Cavalry Offensive Combat 57 

Chapter V. — Cavalry Defensive Action 75 

Chapter VI. — Marches 90 

Chapter VII. — Pursuit 101 



INTRODUCTION 

The aim of the present study is two-fold. First, to 
present in a concise manner and under one cover the general 
principles of the use of Cavalry, with extracts from reports 
covering its work during The World War. Second, to serve 
as a guide for the instructors and members of the classes at 
The General Service Schools in acquiring a general outline 
of the employment, power and limitations of the Cavalry, 
operating independently and with other arms. With the 
above in view, the role of Cavalry ; its operations in connec- 
tion with reconnaissances; the principles that govern ad- 
vance guards, rear guards and outposts ; the Cavalry offen- 
sive combat; its defensive action; the subject of marches; 
and the guiding principles covering pursuits are discussed 
in the seven chapters prepared by the instructors of The 
General Service Schools, reviewed by the Cavalry Board, and 
approved by the War Department as a text-book for The 
General Service Schools. 

H. E. Ely, 

Commandant. 



CHAPTER I 
Role of Cavalry 



The dictionary gives as the definition of the word "role" : 

"A part, or character performed by an actor in a drama; 
hence, a part or function taken or assumed by any one." 

In determining the roles of the combatant arms, the 
question is much simplified by recognizing in the beginning 
that the infantry is the dominant or basic arm in war, and 
that it is the function of all other arms to assist it in fight- 
ing the battles of the war. 

By keeping the above general principle in mind, we 
will have little difficulty in determining the true role of any 
arm, or the methods by which it can best perform its true 
functions. 

There are always a few enthusiasts who honestly be- 
lieve that this or that device or this or that new arm can 
supersede the infantry. If these enthusiasts attempt to 
use the device or arm for this purpose, or attempt to use it 
entirely independently of the infantry, its life is usually very 
short. So far, history shows that the value of any device, 
mechanical or otherwise, or of any arm or service, is in 
direct proportion to the assistance it can render the infantry. 

It has long been the accepted doctrine of our cavalry 
that it must be able to fight mounted or dismounted. 
Mounted action except in squadrons or smaller units will 
generally be associated with a dismounted fight. That this 
doctrine is correct has been proved in The World War. We 
find now that all European nations have accepted this 
principle as true and have reorganized or are in the process 
of reorganizing their cavalry along these lines. 

The uses of cavalry are many and varied ; but it must 
be accepted that the cardinal principles are mobility and fire 
power, of which mobility is the more important. Cavalry 
organized with these two principles in view becomes a po- 
tent factor and a powerful weapon in the hands of the com- 
mander. 

7 



To get the proper relation of cavalry with the other 
arms, it must be remembered that it is an auxiliary to in- 
fantry. It must play its part in the work of the machine 
as a whole. Teamwork is the thing that counts; and the 
jealousies and rivalries of the various arms must be sub- 
merged in the common good of the team. Each has a part 
to play and the greatest success will be attained only when 
each understands its function and its relation to the others. 

The cavalry therefore, like the artillery, the air service, 
the engineers and the signal troops, is an auxiliary to the 
infantry. Its "part or function" in war is to assist the 
infantry by: 

(a) Tactical and strategical reconnaissance. 

(b) Screening or covering the movements of its infantry. 

(c) Seizing and holding important points or positions until 
the arrival of the infantry. 

(d) Providing a mobile reserve — fighting mounted or dis- 
mounted in the line with infantry or on a flank, or ex- 
ploiting a break in the enemy's line. 

(e) Pursuing a defeated enemy. 

(f) Covering the retreat or withdrawal of its infantry, in 
case of defeat. 

(g) In guerrilla or irregular warfare, relieving the infantry 
of the burden of hunting out and defeating the enemy. 

(h) Conducting raids. 

(a) Tactical and Strategical Reconnaissance. 

One of the important duties of cavalry is reconnaissance. 
With small bodies or patrols we frequently refer to this duty 
as scouting or patrolling, but the underlying principle is 
the same in either case, i.e., the object is to gain informa- 
tion. The reconnaissance necessary at the beginning may 
be divided into two classes, strategical and tactical. 

The army cavalry, one or more divisions, is pushed 
far to the front, often several days' march in advance of the 
remainder of the field army, to drive back the covering forces 
of the enemy and to gain information of his dispositions, 
strength and movements. This is the most valuable use of 
the cavalry in the opening stages of a campaign. 

The employment of these cavalry divisions, reconnoiter- 
ing far ahead of the remainder of the field army, is some- 
times called the strategic employment of cavalry, because 
the strategic dispositions made by the army commander 
will be based on information obtained by his cavalry. 

The development of aviation has modified to a large 
extent the strategical employment of cavalry. The distant 



—9— 
strategic reconnaissances, which formerly fell to the lot of 
the cavalry, will now be performed in part by the air ser- 
vice. The air squadrons on this duty will be under the 
direct control of the army commander. The air service 
and the cavalry strategical reconnaissances must go on hand 
in hand. One cannot replace the other. They supplement 
each other. 

In the past, we had only one means of strategical re- 
connaissance, while now we have two. Both are needed 
and should be employed in close teamplay. The air service 
can be charged with determining the depth and the cavalry 
the width of the hostile concentrations, in addition to their 
other general reconnaissance functions. It is as necessary 
now as formerly to cover the front of an army with a cav- 
alry force, well in advance, for strategic and for tactical 
reconnaissance. The air service cannot always maintain 
contact. Many situations will arise when the work can be 
done only by cavalry patrols. It is essential that the cav- 
alry in front of the army obtain early information as to 
the movements and dispositions of the enemy's forces. 
This is its strategic mission. It should have air squadrons 
to assist in the work; they augment the ground recon- 
naissance of the cavalry by more distant tactical reconnais- 
sance. These air squadrons are in addition to those operat- 
ing under the army commander. 

The getting into touch with the enemy's cavalry with 
the view of bringing on the necessary fight to drive him 
from the field lies within the domain of tactical recon- 
naissance. 

(b) Screening or Covering the Movements of. Its 
Infantry. 

The cavalry seeks early the opposing cavalry and drives 
it off. The reason is two-fold: First, to defeat and drive it 
from the field as early as possible, thus obtaining a moral 
superiority and facilitating the getting into touch with the 
enemy's infantry as soon as possible ; second, by driving the 
enemy's cavalry from the field as early as possible our cav- 
alry is able to place a screen in front of our own forces 
through which the enemy should not be able to penetrate. 
The same principle applies to the work of the air service. 



—10— 

(c) To Seize and Hold Important Points or Posi- 
tions Until the Arrival of the Infantry. 

In an advance^ aside from its ability to reconnoiter over 
a larger extent of territory, and allow the unimpeded ad- 
vance of the infantry, cavalry can render invaluable service 
by quickly seizing and holding important points until the 
arrival of the infantry. The Germans in their advance in 
1914, by utilizing their cavalry well in advance were able to 
proceed, almost uninterruptedly, because of the prompt and 
early seizure of important points, notably river crossings. 
When bridges were found destroyed they were repaired be- 
fore the arrival of the infantry. 

(d) As Mobile Reserve. 

As the hostile forces approach each other, the 
cavalry in front is gradually squeezed out and re- 
tired to the rear or to a flank, where, generally, it is held as 
a mobile reserve that can be rapidly moved to any part of 
the line or flank to stop a gap, to seize and hold a critical 
point until the arrival of the infantry, to relieve and assist 
hard pressed infantry, to exploit a success, to take up 
promptly the pursuit in case of success, or to cover the re- 
treat in case of defeat. The cavalry was so used on various 
and sundry occasions during The World War. 

One of the most important uses of cavalry in the hands 
of an able commander is as a mobile reserve. To place such 
a weapon so far to the rear that it cannot be readily called 
upon, to immobilize it, or to fail to utilize it would show at 
once a lack of conception as to the powers and limitations of 
the arm. On a large battle front, in no two parts of the 
field are conditions the same. A gap may be opened. An 
energetic enemy will at once attempt to rush a force through. 
If a mobile cavalry force is at hand, it can be quickly thrown 
in to save the situation. 

A good example is the work of the II Cavalry Corps 
(French) near Luneville in August, 1914. Field Marshal 
Haig says, "Frequently when it was impossible to move 
forward other troops in time, our mounted troops were able 
to fill gaps in the line and restore the situation." 

Or again, a gap may be made in the enemy's line. If 
now a mobile force is available, it may be quickly thrown 



—11— 
into this gap to push ahead and to exploit the advantage 
gained. Marshal Haig further says : "The absence of hos- 
tile cavalry at this period was a marked feature of the 
battle (The German advance of March, 1918). Had the 
German command had at their disposal even two or three 
well-trained cavalry divisions, a wedge might have been 
driven between the French and British Armies." 

Had we had a sufficient cavalry force in the Meuse-Ar- 
gonne operation there is no question that both in the early 
stages of that fight and in the closing stages such cavalry 
could have pushed through and rendered invaluable service. 
There is no doubt that a cavalry force pushed through to 
Sedan on the 1st of November could have cut off a large 
part of the German force to the west. 

(e) To Pursue a Defeated Army. 

To reap the most from a successful battle demands that 
there be at hand a body of fresh troops able to take up a 
prompt and energetic pursuit. For this a mobile cavalry 
command is the ideal force. If the command is large 
enough and energetic enough, the pursuit may be developed 
into a rout. An example of a successful pursuit may be seen 
in that by General Allenby's Mounted Desert Corps 
of the IVth Turkish Army and its practical annihilation. 
Marshal Haig says, "Finally during the culminating opera- 
tions of the war when the German armies were falling back 
in disorganized masses, a new situation arose which de- 
manded the use of mounted troops. Then our cavalry, press- 
ing hard upon the enemy's heels, hastened his retreat and 
threw him into worse confusion." General Kavanagh, com- 
manding the British Cavalry Corps, states that had the war 
lasted a few days longer his corps would have been able to 
capture thousands of prisoners and great quantities of ma- 
terial; that one body of Canadian cavalry was ten miles in 
front of the infantry on the morning of the 11th of Novem- 
ber and picking up many prisoners. 

(f) To Cover the Retreat or Withdrawal of Its 
Infantry in Case of Defeat. 

In case our infantry becomes overwhelmed and > is 
forced to withdraw, a mobile force to be utilized to stem the 
tide and to delay the pursuit until the infantry can with- 



—12— 

draw and organize in the rear is an absolute necessity. Our 
cavalry is particularly well fitted for work of this nature. 
With the fire power it has, it can hold position after position, 
thus delaying the enemy by forcing him to deploy, thereby 
gaining time. Having the horses near at hand, the cavalry 
can quickly withdraw and repeat the action in a new place. 
The difficulty of such an operation for a demoralized and 
exhausted, or defeated infantry is readily apparent. Both 
the French and the British made full use of their cavalry 
in this way in 1914. 

(g) In Guerrilla or Irregular Warfare to Relieve 
the Infantry of the Burden of Hunting Out 
and Defeating the Enemy. 

In guerrilla or irregular warfare, cavalry often plays 
a most important part. Its mobility enables it to hunt out 
the enemy which at times is almost impossible of accom- 
plishment by foot troops. Cavalry has the fighting powers 
to defeat troops of the above mentioned type, after they 
have been located, without assistance from the infantry. 
In operations by a nation strong in cavalry against a weak 
military nation, the cavalry has always taken a most im- 
portant part. In wars of this character there are generally 
at the beginning a few important engagements, conducted 
along the same lines as battles between two strong military 
nations, after which the weaker is forced to resort to ir- 
regular warfare. The cavalry of the stronger nation then 
takes up the burden of the fighting. Examples of this na- 
ture were plentiful in our Indian fighting between 1866 and 
1896. Also in the latter part of the Boer War, in the Philip- 
pine Insurrection, and in the Mexican Punitive expedition 
in 1916. 

(h) To Conduct Raids. 

During the Civil War the cavalry of both sides was fre- 
quently used in raids. Raids may be defined as "isolated 
independent cavalry operations, conducted with secrecy, by 
rapid marches, usually avoiding general engagements. 
Their objects are various, but operations against the enemy's 
line of communications and depots and sources of supply 
are most usual." Whether or not raids will be advisable in 
any future war in which we may participate is problematical. 



—13— 

The improved telephone and telegraph facilities of the pre- 
sent day, to say nothing of airplanes, will make it difficult, 
if not impossible, to secure the secrecy considered essential 
to make a raid successful. It would seem that one of the 
first requirements would be the absolute supremacy of the 
air, otherwise it would be a comparatively easy matter to 
place troops so as to cut off the raiding party. On the 
other hand, it is not inconceivable that circumstances may 
arise which would make a raid a necessity, even at the sacri- 
fice of the entire raiding force. The only question is whether 
the end justifies the means. War with a nation poorly sup- 
plied with an air service, or having none at all, may warrant 
raids on a large scale. While attempts on the enemy's dis- 
tant communications may produce valuable results, they 
must not distract the cavalry from its true battle objectives. 
Many instances occurred in the Civil War where the absence 
of the cavalry on raiding expeditions seriously affected the 
success in battle. From the little literature available it 
appears that a number of raids were conducted on the east- 
ern front during The World War. 

To perform successfully the functions enumerated above 
our cavalry division is organized and given the means to 
act independently, i.e., not in immediate conjunction with 
infantry. Therefore, while it is itself an auxiliary, in the 
sense that its primary function is to assist the infantry, it 
has as an integral part of its organization units of all the 
other auxiliaries and of all the services. It is the only 
auxiliary so organized. In this respect a cavalry division 
is similar to an infantry division, i.e., both are organized 
for independent action and both have units of all the aux- 
iliary arms and services as an integral part of their organi- 
zation. They differ, therefore, only in the part played in 
war and in the technique of their methods of fighting. 

An important point of difference between infantry and 
cavalry is in their different methods of fighting dismounted. 
Infantry formations provide great depth, the total being 
five or more men per yard of front, thereby enabling its 
units to continue the fight for several days, without relief. 
Cavalry on the other hand, has shallow formations, in many 
cases less than one man per yard of front, consisting only 
of the fighting line and local supports and reserves. The 



—14— 

firing line is made relatively strong from the beginning, and 
pushed with promptness and vigor against the enemy. The 
fight is won or lost in a few hours. This is an essential 
difference in their powers and limitations and should not be 
lost sight of. Much of the confusion connected with the 
role of cavalry is due to a misunderstanding of this charac- 
teristic of the arm. 

In the utilization of cavalry, a clear distinction must be 
drawn between cavalry as such and mounted infantry. The 
present day cavalryman must be able to fight both mounted 
and dismounted. The mounted infantryman can fight only 
dismounted. He uses his horse merely as a means of trans- 
port. The history of The World War has proven that the 
days of mounted combat are not over. In the early days of 
a war when the opposing cavalry is trying for supremacy, 
mounted attacks, which may have deployments both in 
frontage and depth, by considerable forces of cavalry may be 
more or less frequent, usually in connection with a dis- 
mounted fight. There is no doubt that numerous occasions 
will occur for mounted attacks by small forces, even up to 
a force as large as a regiment. A combination mounted 
and dismounted attack is often advisable; and if circum- 
stances are favorable, it will be successful. The attack, 
mounted and dismounted, of the British 2d Cavalry Division 
at Moreuil Wood on March 30, 1918, shows that the combina- 
tion is still effective. In fact, it is more effective now than 
ever before. 

One striking lesson of The World War is the complete 
education of the European nations to our American doctrine 
as to the use, armament, and handling of cavalry. Those 
countries that before the war had not accepted the doctrine 
of making a cavalry that would be effective mounted or dis- 
mounted have now accepted that doctrine and are reor- 
ganzing along those lines. To develop this doctrine to its 
maximum requires that the cavalry be armed not only with 
weapons for mounted combat, but also with weapons for dis- 
mounted attack which will put it on a par with foot troops. 
It is for this reason that machine rifles and machine guns 
have been added to the armament of our cavalry. The ob- 
ject sought is the increase in fire power to the highest de- 
gree. The balance between mobility and fire power must 



—15— 
be carefully preserved. If the fire power is increased be- 
yond a certain point, mobility is lost, then cavalry loses its 
real function. Consequently, we insist that while fire power 
must be increased to the maximum, it must not be at the 
expense of mobility. Mobility is the deciding factor, and 
by that is meant not only mobility to move but also mobili- 
ty to fight mounted when the opportunity presents itself. 
Mobility demands careful training in horsemanship, 
ability to move across country, off roads, and over di- 
versified terrain. Cavalry that upon arrival is un- 
able to deliver an intense fire fails in its mission. If cavalry 
is tied down to roads, it then becomes a hindrance rather 
than a help. 

Cavalry must also be able to move long distances in a 
short space of time and arrive at its destination fresh and 
able to fight at once. The French claim that large bodies 
of cavalry can move to distances up to 100 kilometers and 
be ready for action more quickly than infantry can be trans- 
ported a corresponding distance by truck or rail. If all en- 
trucking arrangements have been made and roads are clear 
and good, this claim might not be true; but owing to the 
frequent congestion of roads and the necessity for detrucking 
at a considerable distance back of the hostile position due to 
the enemy fire and to the long road space involved, the 
above conclusions are believed to be conservative. Another 
feature to be considered is that trucks are confined to roads 
whereas cavalry should be able to move off roads for days 
at a time. 

In this connection, the view of Marshal Joffre, as indi- 
cating the changed views of the French, may be interesting. 
These were obtained from him in a personal interview by the 
A. E. F. Cavalry Board. The Marshal agreed with the 
guiding principles that "the usual method of combat will 
be dismounted. For this reason, fire effect, when dismounted, 
should be at least equal to that of a similar number of in- 
fantry. Mobility, involving the rapid execution of long 
marches, must remain unimpaired. Cavalry must remain, 
in armament, training and organization, capable of scouting 
cross country and capable of fighting mounted when oppor- 
tunity presents itself. He expressed the view that the ar- 
mament of cavalry must include a much larger allowance 



—16— 
of automatic rifles, machine guns and cannon, in addition 
to rifles. He stressed especially the importance of mobility, 
indicating that in order to preserve mobility the transport 
pertaining to the cavalry division must be very largely auto- 
mobile. As to scouting, he expressed the opinion that cav- 
alry masses could no longer reasonably be expected to achieve 
results in the service of strategic exploration, but that the 
airplane will have to be depended on largely for this duty. 
However, he emphasized the point that local scouting, par- 
ticularly for the purpose of security and information, will 
always be a very important and necessary function of cav- 
alry; that the tactical security of infantry cannot be ob- 
tained always by airplanes, as their observation is of neces- 
sity intermittent; but that with cavalry the enemy can be 
held under constant contact and observation. He also sta- 
ted, as did Marshal Haig, that two or three German cavalry 
divisions would have been of incalculable assistance after 
the rupture of the allied lines in March and May, 1918. " 
The thought seems never to have entered his mind that cav- 
alry was a thing of the past. He considers merely that it 
must have a transformation. This, of course, is speaking 
only of the French cavalry which had not generally accepted 
our doctrine before the war. 

As cavalry is provided with the means of engaging in a 
dismounted fire action, its tactical dispositions should cor- 
respond generally with infantry dispositions under similar 
circumstances. Cavalry should be thoroughly grounded in 
the methods of dismounted combat, and the cavalry dis- 
mounted instruction should correspond to that of the infan- 
try. A few minor differences and changes are of course 
necessary due to the different organization, but these are 
immaterial or at least readily reconcilable. One striking 
difference is evident. Our experiences in Europe showed the 
necessity for disposition in depth for an infantry attack. The 
same reasons do not apply in the case of cavalry. Due to its 
mobility it can occupy a wider front which naturally means 
less depth. The danger of using shallow formations is coun- 
teracted by the presence of the infantry in rear which forms 
the ultimate reserve. Normally, then, cavalry will be em- 
ployed on wide fronts with relatively little depth. 



—17— 

The local tactics used by dismounted cavalry in an at- 
tack do not differ greatly from those employed by infantry. 
The main difference in the employment of the two arms in 
attack is that the former covers a greater relative front 
and has less depth than the latter. When the enemy's posi- 
tion is such that great depth of formation is necessary in 
order to obtain the requisite driving power, it is not normally 
the function of cavalry to drive the attack home in the same 
way as a staged infantry attack. Either the cavalry should be 
replaced by infantry for the staged attack or the mobility of 
the cavalry should be utilized to find a place where a cavalry 
attack can secure the desired results. 

To sum up we find that the role and tactics of cavalry 
have changed but little ; that cavalry not only has been used 
but will continue to be used ; that its chief characteristics are 
mobility and fire power; that it can fight mounted or dis- 
mounted ; that for reconnaissance it is of inestimable value ; 
that it has a distinct function when used as a screen ; that it 
is invaluable to cover an advance and to seize and hold im- 
portant points until the arrival of the infantry; that as a 
mobile reserve it may have decisive importance when util- 
ized to support threatened points, to stop a gap, to throw in 
where the going is good, to threaten a flank, or to exploit a 
success; that when the enemy is overthrown it is of incal- 
culable value in conducting a rapid pursuit and reaping the 
full reward of the victory; that in case of a defeat or a 
withdrawal it is peculiarly fitted to cover the retreat or 
withdrawal; and that, also, if need be, it can be utilized to 
conduct a distant raid, although this will probably be rare. 



CHAPTER II 
Reconnaissance 



In our Field Service Regulations reconnaissance is de- 
fined as "the military term used to designate the work of 
troops or individuals when gathering information in the 
field." This is a rather broad definition and would include 
all the activities of the Intelligence Section in obtaining 
information by means of secret agents, by the examination 
of prisoners and captured documents, etc. We are at present 
concerned only with the operations of bodies of cavalry and 
individual cavalrymen in acquiring information by personal 
observation. 

In discussing cavalry reconnaissance it is usual to make 
a distinction between strategic reconnaissance and tactical 
reconnaissance. This distinction is based upon the kind 
of information that is sought and the purpose for which it 
is wanted rather than upon means and methods that are 
used in obtaining it. The main distinction is that implied 
by the terms themselves. Strategic reconnaissance seeks 
general information needed by higher commanders for mak- 
ing strategic plans. Tactical reconnaissance seeks detailed 
information needed by commanders of all grades for making 
tactical dispositions. Just as it is impossible to draw a 
clear dividing line between strategy and tactics, so is it 
impossible to make a clear cut distinction between strategic 
and tactical reconnaissance. The distinction here drawn 
must be considered as far from exact. It is intended to 
convey only a general idea. 

Formerly, strategic reconnaissance was almost exclu- 
sively the function of the cavalry. Now, a great part of it 
is done by the air service. In the early stages of a cam- 
paign, before the cavalry forces of the opposing armies have 
come into contact, airplanes capable of covering long dis- 
tances are sent far in advance to get the same kind of in- 
formation that is sought by strategic patrols. These planes 

18 



—19— 
cover that portion of the country containing the best routes 
by which the enemy might invade our country or we might 
invade his. They note such things as concentrations of 
hostile forces, large quantities of road traffic, cantonments, 
camps, etc. 

It is not likely, however, that the airplane can ever en- 
tirely supplant even strategic patrols. The airplane has 
the great advantage of getting its information quickly and 
getting it back quickly. It is able to get a great amount 
of information, but there are certain kinds that can only be 
obtained by reconnaissance on the ground. Such, for in- 
stance, would be the negative information that the enemy 
is not in a certain locality. The air observer could not re- 
port with certainty that a locality is unoccupied, for the 
enemy might be concealed. Another instance would be in- 
formation obtained by questioning inhabitants or prisoners. 
The air observer can learn little at night or in a fog. The 
enemy may have mastery of the air and at the same time be 
weak in cavalry. The best results will be obtained by sup- 
plementing the strategic reconnaissance of cavalry by air 
reconnaissance. 

Reconnoitering Cavalry 

An important duty of cavalry at the beginning of a cam- 
paign, and at other times, when the enemy is at a distance, 
is to get and maintain contact with the enemy's main body 
and to keep the commander informed of its situation and 
movements. To obtain these results, the commander of 
the whole force may employ a strong body of cavalry, gen- 
erally at least a division, to push far in advance of 
the main army. The main mission of this cavalry 
force is strategic reconnaissance, but it also en- 
deavors to prevent reconnaissance by the hostile cavalry. 
Since the hostile cavalry will probably have a similar mis- 
sion, it will sometimes be necessary to defeat it before con- 
tact can be gained with the hostile main body. To defeat the 
hostile cavalry is also the most effective way to prevent its 
obtaining information of the main body of our army. The 
cavalry endeavors to obtain mastery of the ground between 
the two main opposing armies just as the navy seeks mas- 
tery of the sea. Defeat of the hostile cavalry is necessary 
to gain this mastery. "Effective reconnaissance requires 



—20— 
breadth of front; decisive tactical action demands concen- 
tration. The cavalry commander must reconcile these con- 
flicting influences according to the circumstances of the mo- 
ment; he must decide their relative importance at each 
stage of his operations." The commander of this cavalry 
force, therefore, deploys a portion of his force to ad- 
vance on a broad front as contact troops or squadrons and 
follows with the bulk of his command concentrated. Be- 
tween these two are detachments of varying size, to back 
up the contact troops and assist them in breaking through 
the hostile screen or in stopping- the advance of hostile de- 
tachments. The actual reconnaissance is done by patrols 
sent out from the contact troops. 

The idea one is apt to get of a cavalry screen from some 
of the books that touch on the subject is that it is a sym- 
metrical formation consisting of a line of contact troops or 
squadrons at more or less regular intervals, preceded by 
patrols and followed by the bulk of the cavalry concentrated 
in one mass. Like most normal formations diagrammed and 
described in the books, this formation must be understood 
as one that would only fit conditions that will seldom be en- 
countered. The diagrams help one to get a general concep- 
tion of a screen but do not present even an approximately 
accurate picture. Screening is a function or employment of 
cavalry, not a formation. 

The formations to be adopted by cavalry on reconnais- 
sance and the methods to be used in gathering information 
are questions that must be decided in each separate case. 
This is true whether the force involved is a large body of 
cavalry or a small patrol. A controlling consideration is 
usually the strength and dispositions of the hostile cavalry. 

The more information there is on hand before the recon- 
naissance starts, the more effective the reconnaissance will 
be. With a well developed army intelligence organization, 
an army commander should be able to give his cavalry com- 
mander some idea of the enemy's general situation even at 
the beginning of a campaign. It goes without saying that 
every bit of information that has been obtained by airplane 
reconnaissance, the secret service or other intelligence agen- 
cies should be furnished the cavalry commander. This in- 
formation should be thoroughly studied by him and dissemi- 



—21— 

nated throughout his command in order that the recon- 
naissance may be intelligently and effectively carried out. 

The orders given to the cavalry commander should make 
his mission perfectly clear. If more than one mission is 
assigned, he should be informed which is the most important 
mission. Unforeseen conditions may make it necessary to 
abandon part of his mission, and he must know which part 
is vital. The old rule, "Give the cavalry a large order," 
is a very poor rule unless the order indicates what part is 
essential. 

It may be possible for the cavalry to defeat the hostile 
cavalry, to get definite information by contact with the 
enemy's main body and to screen its own army. On the 
other hand, conditions may make it impossible to accom- 
plish more than one of these missions. If the hostile cavalry 
is found directly between the two armies, it may be possible 
to drive it out of the way and detach a force to watch it and 
keep it on the move so that it will have no time to reconnoi- 
ter. The remainder of the force can then be used for contact 
reconnaissance of the enemy's main body. On the other 
hand, the cavalry commander may have reason to believe 
that the hostile cavalry is off to a flank and not directly 
protecting the flank of its army. If the main mission is re- 
connaissance, he should not permit himself to be drawn off 
to one side in order to seek out the hostile cavalry. He 
should get and keep contact with the hostile main army. 
It was a favorite strategem of Ashby, when screening Jack- 
son's force, to appear off on a flank or even in an entirely 
different direction from Jackson's main force. The Federal 
cavalry was almost invariably fooled and drawn after Ashby. 
Jackson was then enabled to attack where he was least ex- 
pected. 

It may be that such full information has been obtained 
by airplane reconnaissance or from other sources that the 
cavalry's main mission is to dispose of the hostile cavalry ; 
or, the hostile cavalry may be in such a superior force that 
there is ho hope of beating it or breaking through its screen. 
In the latter case, it is probable that the best that can be 
done is to prevent hostile reconnaissance and trust to long 
distance patrols working around the flanks or through the 
hostile screen by stealth to get information of the enemy. 



—22— 

The commander of the cavalry, having received his 
orders and studied the situation, makes his plans for carry- 
ing out his mission. In most cases, if reconnaissance is to 
be carried out on a broad front, the plan generally followed 
is to divide the front to be covered into zones and to assign 
a definite force to advance in each zone and be responsible 
for reconnaissance therein. 

The strength of the force to be assigned to each zone 
will vary and depends upon the resistance to be expected, 
the difficulties of the terrain,, the force available for the 
operation, etc. With our large troops, contact troops will 
be used more often than contact squadrons. Use of the 
term "contact squadron" in our service is probably due to 
its use in foreign books. A European squadron is about 
equivalent to our troop. The width of the zones assigned 
also varies according to circumstances. 

The main body of the cavalry is kept more or less con- 
centrated and marches by one, two or several roads accord- 
ing to circumstances. It follows the contact troops at such 
distances as will enable the cavalry commander to use it to 
defeat the hostile cavalry or break through the hostile 
screen. 

In addition to the long distance strategic reconnaissance 
by airplanes operating directly under army headquarters, a 
very important part of the reconnaissance of the cavalry 
division itself is carried out by the observation squadron at- 
tached to it. The air patrols from this squadron should 
reconnoiter several miles in front of the mounted patrols to 
get not only the strategic information that the division is 
endeavoring to secure for the army commander, but also 
the tactical information that the division needs to continue 
its reconnaissance and to defeat the hostile cavalry- Its 
principal function is tactical work with the division. The 
observation squadron will also be of great value to the divi- 
sion commander in keeping him informed of the location of 
his various units and in carrying messages to them. 

Contact Troops 

Within the zone assigned him, the commander of a con- 
tact troop should be allowed great freedom of action in con- 
ducting his reconnaissance. Orders from superior authori- 



—23— 
ty define the approximate boundaries of the zone, regulate 
the extent of the daily advance, and should state the kind of 
information that is specially wanted. The troop commander 
conducts his march, sends out his patrols and supervises 
their work so as to attain the objects of the reconnaissance. 

A contact group will sometimes have three kinds of 
reconnaissance to perform : strategic reconnaissance by offi- 
cers' patrols sent far to the front to get contact with the 
hostile main body ; tactical reconnaissance by patrols sent to 
locate bodies of hostile cavalry and obtain the information 
needed by the cavalry commander for the further conduct 
of the operation; and protective reconnaissance carried out 
by security patrols corresponding to troop advance and flank 
guards. 

The troop will generally advance by successive bounds 
upon the road which appears most important for recon- 
naissance. Halting places will be selected with a view to 
defense and observation to the front as well as to commu- 
nication with the rear. Since the troop must remain out 
for several days, a more rapid advance than about 25 miles 
a day should not be attempted. Everything possible should 
be done to avoid wearing out the horses. In some cases 
light wagons carrying rations and some grain will be able to 
accompany the troop, but as a rule this will be impracticable. 
The wagons will usually have to follow under guard several 
miles in rear and be brought up when conditions are favor- 
able. 

The number of patrols sent out will depend upon the 
importance of the task and the difficulties likely to be en- 
countered. The troop commander should be sure that he 
has sent out enough distant patrols to get the desired in- 
formation. When economy of force is necessary, it is bet- 
ter to economize on security patrols. 

The strength of distant patrols, both strategic and tac- 
tical, will depend principally upon the number of messages 
they are expected to send back. When the opposing armies 
are still at a distance from each other, two messages a day 
will usually be enough. When the enemy is close and the 
troop and the cavalry commanders need prompt warning 
of changes in the tactical situation, more frequent messages 
will be required. If a patrol is expected to overcome resis- 



—24— 

tance, it must be given sufficient strength for the purpose. 
At times a whole platoon may be used as a patrol. 

Arrangements should be made in advance for the relief 
of patrols. Every patrol sent out should know when and 
approximately where it is to rejoin the troop. The relieving 
patrol should take over the duties of the incoming patrol 
before the latter starts in. 

Everything must be done to facilitate communication 
both with the patrols and with the main body. This will 
be a difficult problem even under the most favorable con- 
ditions. Mounted messengers will probably be the chief reli- 
ance for getting messages from patrols. The difficulty of get- 
ting information back through a hostile screen will in most 
cases render it futile to send out strategic patrols to sneak 
through the hostile screen, if the only way to get informa- 
tion back is to send mounted messengers back through the 
screen. The best course will be at first to devote most of the 
energy of reconnaissance to tactical reconnaissance of the 
hostile cavalry with a view to defeating it or to breaking 
through its screen. In the meantime, the air service will 
have to be depended upon for strategical reconnaissance. 
After definite information of the dispositions of the hostile 
cavalry has been obtained, the best course to follow will de- 
pend upon the efficiency of the enemy's screen and other 
activities of his cavalry. As soon as the hostile screen is 
broken up or pierced, contact patrols will get their chance 
to observe the enemy and get their information back. 

If the road situation permits, motorcyclists may ac- 
company the troop and be used for communication to the 
rear. They will be used more frequently with squadrons 
and regiments. In friendly territory full use should be 
made of commercial telegraph and telephone lines. When 
messages must be carried for long distances by mounted men, 
relay posts should be established as the troop advances. 

Lateral communication between contact troops should 
be kept up whenever it is practicable to do so. Continuous 
communication is out of the question in the usual case, but 
a troop commander should take advantage of every favor- 
able opportunity to send patrols to learn the location and 
progress of troops on his right and left. It is desirable for 
troops to assist each other when this can be done without 



—25— 
abandoning the mission of either troop. However, it must 
be kept in mind that the principal mission of each troop is 
to the front and in its own zone. A troop commander should 
not let the failure of his patrols to locate neighboring troops 
delay his advance. Between the larger supporting bodies 
in rear, lateral communication will be less difficult because 
these bodies will advance by bounds which are more de- 
finitely fixed in orders. 

All bodies of the enemy that are encountered should be 
attacked and driven back if possible. If the enemy is en- 
countered in superior force, the troop commander will have 
to use his own judgment as to whether it is better to fall 
back, to make a detour around the enemy, or to hold a posi- 
tion until he can get help from the rear. 

A cavalry force that is advancing to get contact with 
the enemy and to screen its own army can hardly hope to 
prevent small hostile patrols from getting through the screen 
by stealth. A formation consisting of a cordon that would be 
proof against penetration by small hostile patrols could not 
advance rapidly enough to accomplish much in the way of 
reconnaissance. While any hostile patrols that are discovered 
should be captured or driven off, the army must depend 
mainly on its divisional or corps cavalry for protection 
against small hostile patrols. If the mission of the army 
cavalry is to furnish complete protection to its army rather 
than to obtain information for it, suitable measures must 
be taken to prevent the hostile reconnaissance. If the 
cavalry is sufficiently numerous and the army is moving 
forward, this screening may be best done offensively, that 
is by seeking the hostile cavalry and defeating it, and by 
seeking and driving back all hostile patrols on all avenues of 
approach. If the army is not moving forward and closing 
upon the army cavalry, the screening may be done defen- 
sively by establishing cavalry forces along some line that 
it is easy to observe and easy to defend, such as a river 
line, or line of hills with good observation points. 

The sifting of information brought in and the forming 
of a correct estimate of the situation on his front are among 
the most important duties of the troop commander. At 
times, messages will be received which are of such impor- 
tance that they should be transmitted immediately; but in 



—26— 

the usual case, the troop commander's report will be a 
summary of the information received from the patrols on 
his whole front. 

Contact Patrols 

The success of the whole reconnaissance of the 
cavalry depends in a very large measure upon the suc- 
cess of the reconnaissance by the patrols that are sent to 
get contact with the enemy's main body. The main func- 
tion of the contact troops is to support these patrols and to 
make their reconnaissance possible. The proper handling 
of the patrols is a matter of the greatest importance. A 
patrol leader, before starting out, should be thoroughly fami- 
liar with the situation so far as it is known. He should 
know exactly where he is to go, what information he is to 
send in and where and when he is to send it. 

To gain time at first, the patrol should keep to the road 
and advance rapidly until it reaches a locality where the 
enemy is likely to be encountered. As soon as such a lo- 
cality is reached the patrol should advance by successive 
bounds and take every precaution to avoid discovery. It is 
not expected to get detailed information of the enemy's tac- 
tical dispositions and so should avoid approaching too close 
to the enemy. It should not attempt to penetrate the hos- 
tile outpost line unless it is impossible to get the required 
information by observation at a distance. Often it will be 
possible to find a concealed position from which the enemy's 
main dispositions can be observed. From such a temporary 
observation post, a patrol leader can determine such things 
as the location and approximate size of bivouacs or the direc- 
tion of march and approximate strength of marching col- 
umns, and this is the kind of information that is wanted. 

If the enemy advances, the patrol should fall back and 
select new positions from which to observe. The leader 
must keep constantly in mind the necessity for getting in- 
formation back, and avoid getting into a situation in which 
he can get information but cannot get it back. 

If it is necessary to penetrate the hostile cavalry screen, 
in order to get contact with the main body, the patrol should 
endeavor to do so by stealth. If discovered by a hostile 
patrol, it may be necessary for the patrol to fight. It should 
not hesitate to do so if that course seems to afford the best 



—27— 
chance of getting through. Having gotten through the hos- 
tile screen, the chance of getting messages back will be 
slight. The patrol will either have to wait for its support- 
ing troops to beat the hostile cavalry, or work its way back 
through the hostile screen after getting the information for 
which it was sent out. 

As the two hostile armies approach each other the 
cavalry of one side or the other will gain the mastery. If 
our cavalry is defeated and driven off, further reconnais- 
sance may be rendered impossible. Any patrols that may 
not have been involved in the fight should make every effort 
to continue the reconnaissance and send what information 
they can to the nearest troops. Each patrol leader will be 
thrown entirely on his own resources and his task will be- 
come extremely difficult. 

If our cavalry succeeds in driving off the hostile cavalry, 
distant reconnaissance develops into close reconnaissance as 
the two main forces approach each other. More detailed 
information is now needed. More patrols are required and 
more reports must be sent in. Being more closely backed 
up by the infantry less caution is necessary. Every effort 
is now devoted to learning the tactical dispositions of the 
hostile infantry. The army cavalry withdraws to a 
flank and continues its reconnaissance toward the enemy's 
flank and rear. Its duties in front are taken over by the 
corps or divisional cavalry. Since reconnaissance must be 
kept up without a break, some of the contact troops must 
be left in place when the bulk of the army cavalry is 
withdrawn. It is usually better simply to add these troops 
to the strength of the corps cavalry. If too badly worn 
out, they may be withdrawn to the rear through, the in- 
fantry. At any rate there will be many patrols that will 
be unable to rejoin their organizations. They will have to 
join the nearest troops of the corps cavalry. 

Corps and Divisional Cavalry 

Talbles of organization make no provision for the as- 
signment of cavalry to a corps or to an infantry division. 
Under the A. E. F. organization two regiments per corps 
were prescribed. Such part of the army cavalry as is nec- 
essary will be attached to corps and divisions as required. 



—28— 
The force of cavalry with an infantry division (that has any 
at all) will vary from one troop to one regiment. 

Generally speaking, corps or divisional cavalry conducts 
its reconnaissance on the same principles as the army 
cavalry, but the situation and mission of the body to which 
it is attached will make a great difference in the work re- 
quired of it. If not under the control of an advance guard 
commander, the bulk of the cavalry will usually be kept to- 
gether as corps cavalry. If part of it is used with the 
advance guard, the part so used will be attached to the di- 
vision whose troops constitute the advance guard. In certain 
situations when two or more divisions are advancing 
abreast, each division may have cavalry attached to it as 
divisional cavalry, and each division may use its cavalry 
either with its advance guard or as the situation demands. 

If advancing with an interior corps of the line and there 
is other cavalry directly in front, the principal work 
of the corps cavalry will be to protect its infantry from the 
reconnaissance of hostile patrols. Under these circum- 
stances it will generally form part of the infantry advance 
guards (as divisional cavalry) . It must keep up communi- 
cation with the army cavalry in its front and keep fully in- 
formed of the situation and intentions of the latter in order 
that it may be ready to take over the duties of contact recon- 
naissance at the proper time. 

If there is no army cavalry in front, the work of 
the corps cavalry will be more important and more difficult. 
Much of its strength will be required for the local protection 
of the infantry. At the same time it is necessary for the 
infantry to have information of the enemy in its front. 
Conditions will usually make it impracticable for the main 
body of the corps cavalry to operate more than a few miles 
in front of its infantry. Such part as can be spared from 
the local protection of the infantry will be too weak to ven- 
ture very far from infantry support, and it therefore can 
not back up its patrols or assist them to break through the 
hostile screen. Its patrols must operate almost entirely by 
stealth since they cannot expect support.. In a country 
having good roads this situation could be remedied by send- 
ing infantry in trucks to accompany bodies of corps cavalry 
sent to reconnoiter at a distance. In this case the cavalry 



—29— 
would do the recormoitering and the infantry would furnish 
the necessary resistance. In the Russo-Japanese War, the 
Japanese habitually furnished infantry supports (afoot) for 
their reconnoitering detachments. However, the Japanese 
accomplished very little in the way of distant reconnaissance. 
Most of their information was obtained through Chinese 
spies. The Germans used cyclists units to back up their 
cavalry in 1914. 

Cavalry with a flank corps must use a greater propor- 
tion of its strength for protective reconnaissance than is 
necessary with an interior corps, for it must protect both 
the front and flank of the infantry. At the same time, such 
troops as can be spared for distant reconnaissance will have 
better opportunities to succeed. They will have more space 
in which to operate and will have a better chance to recon- 
noiter toward the enemy's flank and rear. For these rea- 
sons it will be advisable to increase the strength of the cav- 
alry assigned to a flank corps. 

Patrols that are sent from the corps cavalry to recon- 
noiter at a distance employ the same methods as those ex- 
plained for the distant patrols sent out by other cavalry on 
the same mission. The principal difference is in the degree of 
caution with which the reconnaissance must be conducted. 
There will be few occasions on which it will be advisable for 
a patrol to fight. Reports from these patrols will have to be 
brought back through the enemy's cavalry and should not be 
entrusted to single messengers. A patrol of two or three 
men commanded by an intelligent noncommissioned officer 
will often be required to carry back important information. 

When the two opposing armies approach each other and 
a battle is imminent, the corps cavalry is responsible for tac- 
tical reconnaissance until the infantry comes into contact 
with the hostile infantry. The patrols are now more closely 
backed up by the main body of the cavalry which in turn 
is backed up by the infantry. It is no longer necessary for 
the patrols to move with such great caution. It will fre- 
quently be desirable for a patrol to capture a prisoner or two 
in order to get identifications or to learn more of the enemy's 
intentions. If necessary for a patrol to fight at this stage, 
it can do so without being exposed to such great danger of 
capture. The best reconnaissance will probably be done by 



—30— 
those patrols that are able to secure temporary observation 
posts from which the dispositions of the enemy can be seen, 
for they will be able to get information back more promptly 
and with more certainty than those patrols that have come 
into actual collision with the enemy. 

Reconnoitering Patrols 

There is much that might be said in general about the 
conduct of reconnoitering patrols; this subject belongs to 
minor tactics. The following notes on the conduct of re- 
connoitering patrols review the main points to be remem- 
bered. They are extracts from a paper issued by the Cav- 
alry School. 

Duties of Officer Sending Out Patrols 

1. Studies his mission in accordance with orders received. 

2. Determines number of patrols to be sent out and strength 
of each. 

3. Determines time when information must be back at start- 
ing point of patrol or time and place where it shall meet com- 
mand, if enroute. This time is determined entirely by tactical 
requirements. 

4. Determines time when patrols shall start. 

5. Issues warning instructions to patrol leader in plenty of 
time. 

6. Issues orders in presence and hearing of all men of the 
patrol. Always written orders if possible. Orders must be re- 
peated or read and explained so that every member of the patrol 
hears them and understands them. 

Form of Order to Patrol 

1. (a) Information concerning enemy (only such information as is 

necessary for patrol to know in order to perform intelligently 
its work), 
(b) Information concerning our own troops. This covers: 

Other patrols sent or to be sent out. 

Location of, or general situation of our own troops, as far 
as may be necessary or wise to give it. 

2. Mission of the main body (that is the force from which the patrol 

is sent out) and what it is going to do. If it marches, state when, 
by what route, on what point, at what rate of travel. Everything 
that the patrol leader should know so as to have teamwork with 
his commanding officer. 

3. Mission of the patrols to which these orders are given. 

(a) General direction to be followed, or where to go. 

(b) Purpose. 

(c) Information desired. 

(d) Where and when to return. 

4. Equipment, rations and forage to be taken, unless already provided 

for. 

5. Where messages are to be sent. 



—31— 

In any case the mission must be stated in clear, de- 
finite, positive terms, leaving the patrol leader in no doubt 
as to exactly what is wanted or as to where he should go. 
The commander should assume himself the responsibility 
for the orders he gives, and should not resort to a hazy, 
foggy order, hoping that the patrol leader will in some way 
determine for himself just where the patrol is to go and 
what it is to look for. 

After these orders are issued, the patrol leader should 
be allowed to ask questions. He should not hesitate to ask 
questions about anything he does not fully understand. He 
owes this to himself and to his mission. If the patrol leader 
asks no questions, the officer sending out the patrol may 
question him in order to be sure that he understands. 

When there is time, the officer sending out the patrol 
should inspect it to verify the detail and inspect men, 
horses and equipment. 

Duties of Patrol Leader 

1. Upon receipt of warning instructions or of order, if 
no warning instructions are issued, he secures horses and 
men for patrol; inspects horses to see that they are in fit 
condition and well shod ; replace those that are of conspicu- 
ous color or neigh when alone; has the horseshoer tighten 
loose shoes if there be any ; has horses watered, and if time 
permits, fed before starting. 

2. At assembly time he mounts the patrol and inspects 
it to see that no articles of equipment are carried other than 
those ordered. 

3. He then organizes his patrol by designating a second 
and, if he considers necessary, a third in command. 

4. If the officer who sends out the patrol is not present, 
the patrol leader reads his written orders or gives verbal 
orders to the patrol. , In all cases, however, the entire 
situation relating to the enemy and our own troops, the 
mission, when and where to return and place to which mes- 
sages are to be sent must be explained and made perfectly 
clear to the whole patrol. 

5. A patrol leader should not send men on missions of 
reconnaissance far away from the patrol. For a small pa- 
trol the limit should be about 300 yards. If reconnaissance 



—32— 
to a greater distance from the line of march is necessary, it 
should be carried out by the whole patrol. 

6. A patrol operating dismounted in "no man's land" 
in trench warfare situations must have a "get-away" man 
in rear. In open warfare situations, and especially for 
mounted patrols, no "get-away" man need be detailed. The 
patrol leader may need every man he has. At the smallest 
scrimmage a "get-away" man might, using his own discre- 
tion, gallop off, weaken the patrol, disclose its position or be 
captured and give away valuable information. In case of a 
sudden dash forward he may be lost. 

The patrol must stay together and take the patrol's 
luck and chances. If it meets with a disaster, it is the duty 
of every man to fight and to escape the enemy. A small 
patrol should fight mounted. Somebody will almost certain- 
ly get away if all the others fall. Not until the leader is 
dead or captured and his successors meet a like fate, and 
there are no longer enough men left to perform their mis- 
sion, should any man think of being a get-away man. 

Conduct of The Patrol 

1. Make it a rule never to send less than two men to 
make a reconnaissance to the flank. 

2. While in general, a reconnoitering patrol avoids 
combat and operates under concealment, it fights if its 
mission demands it i or if it can, without detriment to its 
mission, inflict loss upon the enemy or secure valuable 
advantages to its own troops. In all cases the action of a 
patrol, so far as concerns fighting or avoiding a fight, is 
governed by its mission. The patrol leader must consider 
that every hostile patrol in his rear makes his messenger 
service so much less secure. 

3. The patrol and the parts thereof proceed by bounds. 
When crossing a ravine, stream or narrow valley, the two 
leading men should be on the farther side before the main 
body crosses. When approaching a crest the leading man 
should increase the gait and get up on it well ahead of the 
remainder of the patrol. Both men will then have time to 
look over the crest to the ground beyond before exposing 
themselves on the top. 



4. A patrol, when near the enemy, operates preferably 
on the side roads. Large bodies use main roads ; the patrol 
may therefore expect the enemy will use main roads. It 
can observe better from the side roads. 

5. The patrol leader should not voluntarily break up 
his patrol into two or more parts. The officer who sent out 
the patrol specified its strength; he believed that a certain 
number of men were necessary to enable the patrol to ac- 
complish its mission. For the leader of the patrol to split 
his patrol into two or more parts is an unwarranted as- 
sumption that he is a better judge than his commander of 
what is the proper strength. 

Messages 

(a) Should always be written. 

(b) In hostile country two messengers should be sent 
to carry a message. The leader may not want to spare that 
many, but if the message is of sufficient importance two men 
had better be sent. If the message is not of great impor- 
tance it is better not to send any. But the simplest things 
may sometimes be of great importance. In friendly coun- 
try one man may be sufficient. In hostile country very im- 
portant messages should be sent in duplicate, using different 
routes. 

Instructions to Mounted Messengers 

(a) Read the message to the messengers and be sure that 
both understand. 

(b) Tell them where to deliver it. 

(c) Designate the messenger in charge. 

(d) Tell him to destroy the message if in danger of capture. 

(e) Route to take if necessary to leave road, the compass 
bearing to follow. 

(f ) What to do after delivering message. 

(g) Gait. 

When to Send Messages 

(a) When any information has been obtained that the 
patrol was sent out to get. The mission of the patrol 
determines this. 

(b) The patrol leader must consider that he may be 
called upon to send several or many messages ; that he must 
therefore retain enough men with him to get back the im- 
portant information he discovers. His own judgment must 
decide what is important or unimportant. 



CHAPTER III 
Advance Guards, Rear Guards and Outposts 



The general principles that govern the operations of 
advance guards, rear guards, and outposts are applicable 
no matter what the composition of these bodies. We are at 
present concerned with the application of these principles 
to cavalry (a) when acting alone or as the predominating 
arm, and (b) when constituting a part only of an infantry 
organization on these duties. 

Advance Guards 

This subject will be considered under the headings : 

(a) Cavalry advance guards, i.e., when cavalry is the pre- 
dominating arm. 

(b) When cavalry constitutes a part only of an infantry 
advance guard. 

Generally speaking, a cavalry advance guard is used 
with a cavalry command, although cavalry may constitute 
the predominating arm of an advance guard of an infantry 
command. The only important difference in its action is 
that in the latter case it must conform to the pace of the 
infantry. 

Cavalry Advance Guards 

Our Field Service Regulations define advance guard 
as follows : An advance guard is a detachment of the main 
body which precedes and covers it on the march. 

Its duties are: 

1. To guard against surprise and furnish information by re- 
connoitering to the front and flanks. 

2. To push back small parties of the enemy and prevent their 
observing, firing upon, or delaying the main body. 

3. To check the enemy's advance in force long enough to per- 
mit the main body to prepare for action. 

4. When the enemy is encountered on the defensive, to seize 
a good position and locate his lines, taking care not to bring on a 
general engagement unless empowered to do so. 

5. To remove obstacles, repair the road, and favor in every 
way possible the steady march of the column. 

34 



—35— 

The primary function of an advance guard is to insure 
the uninterrupted advance of the main body and to give it 
time for deployment in case the enemy is encountered. It 
acts as a pivot of maneuver for the main body, and insures 
it freedom of action in its preparation for battle. This is 
the real reason for its creation, and the guiding principle 
in its composition, strength, formations, and operations. 

In an advance a march order is issued, one paragraph of 
which prescribes the composition and special functions of 
the advance guard. Based on the march order the advance 
guard commander issues an advance guard order, under the 
provisions of which the advance guard is organized and 
operates. 

The strength of a cavalry advance guard varies between 
one-twelfth and one-third of the entire force. The advance 
guard of a cavalry division generally consists of all arms, 
except infantry. 

A cavalry advance guard, like an infantry advance 
guard, consists of a series of detachments increasing . pro- 
gressively in size from front to rear, each being charged 
with the duty of protecting from surprise, the body imme- 
diately following it, and gaining time for the latter to pre- 
pare for action. The leading elements are also charged 
with the duties of gaining and reporting early information 
of the enemy. 

The advance guard is divided into two parts, a reserve 
and a support. The latter is divided into a support and an 
advance party. The advance party usually consists of 
from one-sixth to one-half of the entire support. The 
strength of each element from front to rear should be the 
minimum necessary to perform its functions of observation 
and resistance. The advance party must be strong enough 
to provide a point and also patrols for reconnoitering to the 
front and flanks. 

The distance between the advance party and the sup- 
port varies from 500 yards to 1 mile, depending on the 
strength of each and the character of the country. The ad- 
vance party, like a patrol or flankers, must be able to see 
more than can be seen by the support. The distance will be 
less in a close country, in a fog or at night, than it would be 
in open country, in fair weather or in the daytime. 



—36— 
The support is the first body that possesses any real 
powers of resistance. It must be able to support its ad- 
vance party and to hold the enemy long enough to give the 
reserve time to prepare for action. The relative strength 
of the support to the reserve depends on the character of 
the operations and the nature of the country. If the object 
is to force an engagement, the support will be relatively 
strong and will be followed at a short distance by the re- 
serve. It is generally advisable to preserve, as far as prac- 
ticable, the integrity of tactical units. If the support ac- 
tually requires two* troops to perform its functions it might 
be better to send the entire squadron. The same principle 
applies to larger or smaller units. All of the advance guard, 
except that portion actually needed with the preceding ele- 
ments, marches with the reserve. The support usually con- 
sists of from one-fourth to one-half of the entire advance 
guard. Its distance from the reserve varies from 700 yards 
to H miles. 

The commander of the support sees that the proper 
route is followed by the advance guard, and he should desig- 
nate a qualified officer or man to perform this duty. This is 
important because if the advance party takes the wrong 
road it may throw the whole advance guard, or even the 
main body, off the prescribed route. 

The distance of the reserve from the main body varies 
according to conditions, but generally it is from 800 to 1,500 
yards for small forces, and from 1,000 yards to 2 miles for 
large forces. As. forces become smaller the reserve, support 
and advance party, in turn, are omitted. 

Flankers and patrols are detached from time to time 
from all elements of the advance guard to reconnoiter a des- 
ignated point or area, and with orders to rejoin at a desig- 
nated place or time. Unless there is a definite object to be 
gained, they should not be sent. When these detachments 
leave, they should be given a definite mission, with specific 
instructions where to go, what to do, and when to return. 
If conditions require that flankers remain out for considera- 
ble periods of time, their distances from the main body will 
depend on the character of the country. They must go where 
they can see better or get more information than can be 
seen or gotten by the column from which sent. 



—37— 

Patrols and flankers vary in strength from two troop- 
ers to a platoon. They usually consist of from two men to a 
squad. Generally speaking, a single patrol of two or three 
men can see as much as a single patrol of twelve men. How- 
ever, in addition to their reconnoitering functions, they must 
be strong enough to provide messengers should the latter be 
required. A patrol may visit several successive places, 
from each of which a message is to be sent back to the col- 
umn. In such a case troopers for messenger service must be 
included in the original strength. If, however, a patrol is 
to visit one point and return, no messengers are needed. 

Patrols must also have strength to contend with hostile 
patrols. If the latter are strong, consisting of six to twelve 
troopers, the former must also be strong. The same rules 
as to strength apply to patrols that apply to other elements 
of an advance guard, i.e., the strength should be the mini- 
mum consistent with a proper performance of their duties. 

Signals prescribed in our drill regulations and service 
manuals should be freely used. 

Because of the fact that considerable distances can be 
covered in short lengths of time, cavalry patrols are fre- 
quently sent to unnecessary points. This should be avoided. 
Such a use of the mounts soon breaks them down. The 
strength of the mounts should be conserved. It will be 
needed later. 

There is no such a thing as a normal formation. The 
strength of the different elements, their composition, for- 
mations, distances and methods of operation depend upon 
the topography of the country, the character and intentions 
of the enemy, and the plans of the commander of the army. 

The distances mentioned in the advance guard order are 
only approximations and are given as a general guide. For 
example, the advance party on approaching a crest of a 
ridge, should estimate the distance to the next crest and 
should if necessary increase its gait so as to reach it by the 
time the head of the support reaches the first ridge. The 
same rule applies to patrols and flankers. They must ex- 
tend or reduce their distances so as to be able to see more 
than can be seen by the bodies from which they are sent. 
In other words, all elements of the advance guard advance 
by bounds. The bounds of the small elements are short and 



—38— 
frequent while those of the large elements are longer and 
less numerous. 

If the advance guard contains as much as a squadron, 
machine guns should usually be attached. Their fire increases 
very materially the resisting powers of the support. In an ad- 
vance guard consisting of a regiment, there usually will be 
attached units of all the auxiliary arms. Artillery is of great 
value to the advance guard in preparing the way for an 
attack and in compelling the enemy to deploy at a distance. 
Horse artillery has sufficient mobility for a cavalry advance 
guard. 

Engineers, with necessary combat trains, should march 
with the support of large advance guards and with the re- 
serve of advance guards of a regiment. Their principal 
function is to repair bridges, remove obstacles, etc. 

The air service and cavalry should work in conjunction 
with each other. The planes must know the route of the 
cavalry and its subdivisions. They can communicate their 
information to the advance guard by radio, or failing in this, 
by dropping messages. 

If a fight is imminent, the field trains of the advance 
guard are, as a rule, kept with the field trains of the main 
body. Conditions permitting, they march at the rear of the 
reserve. The combat trains of the support, especially in 
small forces, follow the reserve or may be farther to the 
rear. The combat trains are not as mobile as a cavalry 
advance guard. As a general rule, the trains of a cavalry 
advance guard are kept at least to the rear of the reserve, if 
not farther to the rear ; thus preserving the maximum mo- 
bility of the troops. 

Reliable means of communication must be maintained 
among all elements of the advance guard and between the 
latter and the main body. All of the prescribed methods 
should be available. Under our present organization, each 
unit from a squadron up has signal troops and equipment. 
These are sufficient to provide lines of information. It is 
usually practicable to use radio with the larger subdivisions 
of the advance guard. Squadrons and larger organizations 
are equipped with radio sets. By previous arrangement, they 
can be set up at certain designated times when all accumu- 
lated messages are sent and received. These sets can 



—39— 
then dismantle, pack and trot until they regain their place 
in the column. In large advance guards two or more sets 
may be used, one with the support and one with the reserve. 
Wire lines are not as a rule practicable during the march but 
may connect up all elements as soon as the day's march is 
over. Motorcycles are valuable when the roads are reason- 
ably good, but on dirt roads, or in wet weather, they are not 
dependable. Pyrotechnics may be used under certain con- 
ditions. Pigeons are good especially for a few important 
messages from distant points. They can only be used, how- 
ever, from the front to some fixed point in rear, and they 
are difficult to transport with the advance elements of an ad- 
vance guard. 

The mounted messenger is the most dependable and the 
most practicable means of communication during the march, 
and is faster than radio within 2 miles for uncoded messages 
and 5 miles for coded messages. Important messages should 
be carried by officers. Experience has demonstrated that 
a chain of connecting troopers is sometimes useful between 
elements of the advance guard. They should follow each 
other at distances of from 200 to 500 yards. The rule is 
that each trooper must be able to see the one next preceding 
and next following. By means of the usual signal they can 
quickly communicate orders for halts or starts, increase or 
decrease in gaits, and change of direction. Messages can be 
quickly passed from one body to another. For example, a 
trooper from the head of the reserve takes a message by in- 
creased gait to the connecting trooper next preceding, the 
latter to the next, and so on. Each takes the place of the 
man he relieves. As soon as a message goes back all the 
men are returned to their original places. This is not hard 
on the mounts as none of them cover additional distance. 
Messages between the advance guard and patrols and flank- 
ers have to be carried by messengers. 

The marching message center should know all the means 
of communication at its disposal and should use those best 
suited to the conditions in each particular case. A resource- 
ful message center will never fail to maintain, even under 
most adverse conditions, reasonably satisfactory lines of 
information. 



—40— 

As a rule, the different organizations of a command per- 
form in turn the duty of advance guard. The advance guard 
also may be taken from a designated unit, say for instance, 
the leading brigade of a division or the leading division of 
a corps. In some cases the responsibility for providing 
the necessary advance guard is delegated to the commander 
of such a unit. In long columns it is impracticable to 
change daily the position in the column of the larger units 
as is done in the case of smaller units. 

The advance guard commander is responsible for its 
formation and conduct. He should bear in mind that its 
purpose is to facilitate the march of the main body. Its 
own security must be effected by proper disposition and or- 
ganization, not by timid or cautious advance. Its action 
when the enemy attempts to block it with a large force de- 
pends on the situation and plans of the commander of the 
whole force. 

An advance guard should act aggressively. Timid or 
cautious action seldom gives decisive results. If the enemy 
is in the vicinity, patrols should be pushed well to the front 
to get and send back early information of his location and 
movements. 

The use of patrols in front of the advance guard however 
is not to be adopted as a general rule. The situation should 
be studied and they should be sent out only when their use 
can assist in the accomplishment of the mission of the main 
body or the general functions of the advance guard. 

The point, as stated above in discussing distances, 
moves forward by bounds from one point of observation to 
the next. On sighting the enemy, it should act at once. With 
cavalry especially, the body that acts first has a decisive ad- 
vantage over a slower acting enemy. The former may gain 
a victory before the latter has made up his mind what to do. 
In a meeting engagement, the enemy's formation is gen- 
erally more or less similar to our own. Patrols encounter 
patrols and the point encounters the point. When the ene- 
my is sighted, a few men of the point usually remain in ob- 
servation while the remainder attack mounted, either 
straight to the front or by a flank, depending on the hostile 
dispositions and the nature of the topography. An aggres- 
sive point invariably succeeds in driving back a less aggres- 



—41— 
sive point. As soon as the hostile point has been driven back 
or defeated, the victor proceeds at once to get information of 
the hostile advance party and of its dispositions. The ad- 
vance party, like the point, should act aggressively. There 
should be no unnecessary delays, because every minute gives 
the enemy an opportunity to prepare to meet the attack. The 
hostile advance party should not be given time to dismount 
or to occupy a defensive position. If it attempts to do so, it 
should be attacked while in the act of dismounting or before 
it can complete its change of formation. An aggressive 
advance party, like an aggressive point, will generally suc- 
ceed in driving the hostile advance party back on its sup- 
port. The advance party should then push on against the 
hostile support and with the assistance of its own support 
should drive the former back on its reserve. Meanwhile the 
reserve should have been pushing forward and should be 
close at hand prepared to take advantage of any hesitation 
or weakness on the part of the hostile reserve. It must.be 
remembered that the hostile main body is the real objective. 

Quick, decisive action will often win with cavalry where 
more deliberate action will fail, even though better tactics 
appear to be employed in the latter case. Unless the two op- 
posing commanders possess an equally aggressive spirit, the 
more aggressive has a decided advantage. In action of cav- 
alry against cavalry, the chief reliance must be placed on 
mounted action. Only the numbers necessary to support 
the mounted attack should be dismounted. If the ene- 
my adopts dismounted action, he is at once thrown on the 
defensive, and must immediately be supported, or he will be 
taken in flank and rear, his led horses will be captured, 
killed or driven off, and he may be defeated before. assis- 
tance can reach him. 

In meeting infantry, more caution must be exercised; 
but this must not be carried to the extreme of allowing a 
few dismounted men to hold up a considerably larger force 
of mounted men. If the hostile infantry cannot be attacked 
from the front, a threatened attack against a flank or the 
rear will usually result in forcing it back on its supporting 
elements. When a mounted cavalry support meets a dis- 
mounted hostile support, the former can often dismount a 
few men to make a feint from the front while the bulk of 



—42— 

the force moves against the hostile flank or rear. The same 
rule of action applies to the entire advance guard. In ad- 
vance guard operations, even against infantry, so long as 
the advance guard is on the offensive, mounted action is of 
primary importance. A greater proportion of men may 
have to be dismounted than in a cavalry action ; but the ob- 
ject of the dismounted fight should be to hold the enemy 
until the mounted troops can attack a flank or the rear. The 
enemy seeing himself about to be surrounded, will generally 
fall back unless support is near at hand. 

If the enemy is in such a strength that an advance is 
impossible, the advance guard must take up the defensive, 
and each element of the advance guard must hold the ene- 
my long enough to enable the following elements to prepare 
for action. If there is a good position for the main body 
near the front of the advance guard, the latter must endeavor 
to seize and hold it until the main body can occupy it. 

♦ The commander of each element of an advance guard, 
from the leading patrols to the reserve, inclusive, should con- 
tinuously study the topography of the country and other 
conditions, have a plan of action always in mind, and be 
ready to put the plan into instant operation when the enemy 
is encountered. The commander who follows this line of 
action is always prepared for any emergency that may 
arise, he loses no time in considering what to do or how to do 
it, and he is thereby able to take advantage of any weak- 
nesses in this respect on the part of the enemy. Moreover, 
prompt, decisive action inspires troops with confidence, and 
encourages them to act with boldness and aggressiveness. 
A spirit of this kind will often win where timidity will fail. 
The commander of an advance guard must exercise 
judgment and make his dispositions in accordance with the 
nature of the ground and the character of the orders under 
which he is acting. There is no more important duty than 
that of an advance guard commander, and his responsibilities 
are very heavy. If he permits the main body to be delayed 
by inferior forces or surprised, or it is compelled to take ac- 
tion not in accordance with the plan of the commander, he 
has failed in his mission. 

In a retreat, a small body of troops, called leading troops, 
is sent ahead. These troops are a substitute for an advance 



• —43— 

guard. Their duties are to clear the road, to see that bridges, 
roads, and fords are prepared for the main body, and to 
disperse small parties of hostile inhabitants who may at- 
tempt to retard their march. 

When Cavalry Constitutes a Part Only of an 
Infantry Advance Guard 

In a composite advance guard, cavalry is especially 
well suited for the performance of the duties enumerated 
in sub-paragraphs (1), (2), and (5), supra. Its mobility 
enables it to reconnoiter to a distance and get its informa- 
tion back quickly. It has sufficient fire power to push 
back small parties of the enemy and to protect engineering 
parties engaged in repairing roads, etc. 

The composition of the advance guard depends mainly 
on the size of the force, the plans of the commander, the 
distance separating the hostile forces, and the character of 
the country. Generally, an infantry advance guard should 
have cavalry attached for reconnaissance purposes. Artil- 
lery may not be necessary. In an open country, when the 
distances to be observed are great, the advance guard may 
consist in large part of cavalry. In a close, rough country, 
the proportion of cavalry in an infantry advance guard 
would usually be small. Experience has demonstrated that 
two or more factors, sometimes conflicting, have to be har- 
monized in the organization of an advance guard. The com- 
mander, therefore, must take all the conditions into con- 
sideration and so organize the advance guard as best to meet 
them. 

The strength of the cavalry with an advance guard 
varies with the conditions previously discussed. In an open 
country with the enemy at some distance, cavalry might 
constitute one-half of the advance guard of a division. When 
the enemy is within a day's march and in close country, or 
with only a few roads to cover, the cavalry would probably 
consist of a squadron or less. The guiding rule is to have 
as much cavalry, and no more, as is needed to perform the 
legitimate functions of cavalry. 

In a large advance guard, the entire support may con- 
sist of cavalry. As a rule, however, any such strength 
would justify using it on a separate mission rather than ty- 



—44— 

ing it to the advance guard. If there is sufficient cavalry 
the advance party may be composed of that arm only. This 
assignment would relieve the infantry of all, or almost all, 
the patrolling. 

In the methods of operation, the same general principles 
apply to cavalry with an advance guard as to similar bodies 
in a cavalry advance guard. Due, however, to its being 
supported by infantry, the cavalry is not likely to have to 
offer as much resistance in a meeting engagement as a 
cavalry advance guard. 

Cavalry Rear Guard 

Covering a retreat is a special function of cavalry. It 
is preeminently fitted for this duty. A retreat of a cavalry 
force is covered by a cavalry rear guard. In a retreat of 
an infantry force, cavalry usually is assigned a special mis- 
sion, but it may constitute a part of the rear guard. In 
covering a retreat, it is when acting directly under the or- 
ders of the supreme commander that the cavalry plays its 
most important role. As the subject of army and corps cav- 
alry is covered in other studies, this discussion treats of : 

(a) Cavalry rear guard, i.e., when the rear guard is composed 
entirely of cavalry, or when cavalry is the predominating arm. 

(b) Cavalry constituting a part of an infantry rear guard. 

Cavalry Rear Guard 

An infantry command in retreat generally uses its 
cavalry either on a special mission or as rear guard cav- 
alry. It may use a part for one duty and a part for the 
other. 

Generally speaking, a "cavalry rear guard" is used only 
with a cavalry command, but it may be used with an infantry 
force. Due to its mobility, a defeated cavalry force can 
withdraw more easily than infantry. If the pursuing force 
is infantry, the retreating cavalry can, within a few hours, 
clear itself of the enemy, so its rear guard functions soon 
cease to be of any great importance. If the pursuing force 
is cavalry, the retreat becomes more difficult and the rear 
guard duty of much greater importance. However, in this 
case, the rear guard duty is not so difficult as similar duty 
for an infantry force. This because the mobility of the 
retreating force is as great as that of the pursuing force. 



—45— 

When a commander decides to retreat he issues a re- 
treat order, one paragraph of which prescribes the organiza- 
tion and duties of the rear guard. In the beginning of a 
retreat, the troops of a rear guard, when practicable, are 
selected from those that have had previous local successes, 
or have suffered little loss, and are comparatively fresh. 
After a retreat is once organized, the outpost of the night 
usually forms the rear guard of the following day. The 
composition of a rear guard is practically the same as that 
of an advance guard. A large rear guard generally contains 
units of all the auxiliary arms. There should be as many 
guns with the rear guard as can be effectively used and 
freely maneuvered. The effective use of artillery may ob- 
viate the necessity of deploying the other arms of the rear 
guard, the deployment of the enemy at a distance being 
compelled by the fire of the guns. The strength of a rear 
guard depends upon the nature of the country and the 
strength and character of the pursuing force. It cannot, 
like an advance guard, count on the support of the main 
body. As a rule, it corresponds to the strength of an ad- 
vance guard on a forward march. 

Based on the retreat order, the rear guard commander 
issues a rear guard order, prescribing the formation of the 
rear guard, its duty as a whole, and the duty of each ele- 
ment thereof. The rear guard order gives such detailed in- 
formation as to formations and special methods to be em- 
ployed as are necessary. Afterwards, instructions to frac- 
tions of the rear guard are generally brief and often must 
be verbal. They generally contain nothing more than the 
location of a position to be occupied by a unit ; the designa- 
tion and destination of troops whose withdrawal is to be 
covered ; when to withdraw or break off the fight ; route to 
be followed in withdrawal and whether it will be covered by 
other troops ; where further instructions will be received and 
where messages will be sent. Reconnaissance of successive 
positions can generally be made by officers and troops de- 
tailed for the purpose. In addition, the rear guard com- 
mander should carry on such personal reconnaissance as 
time and situation permit. 

The proximity and conduct of the enemy control, to a 
large extent, the formation of a rear guard. When it is 



—46— 

not necessary to withdraw in deployed lines, the greater 
part of the rear guard marches on the road in column of 
route, taking up a formation resembling that of an advance 
guard faced to the rear. The distribution of troops is 
therefore similar to that of an advance guard, namely: 

Reserve. 
Support. 

The support, as in an advance guard, is divided into 
two parts. The part nearest to the enemy is called the rear 
party and marches with a rear point. Mounted engineers 
usually accompany the support and may be attached to the 
rear party. Machine guns are most valuable with a rear 
guard and should be freely used. The rear guard should, if 
possible,, be entirely free from impedimenta, in order that, if 
separated from the main body ■by a considerable distance, 
it may close up by forced marches. 

A rear guard, in its formations on the road, or on the 
line of march, is practically an advance guard reversed. It 
has from head to tail, its reserve, support, rear party and 
rear point. The same relative distribution of troops as an 
advance guard is maintained. The rear guard like the ad- 
vance guard, does not work at fixed distances. It increases 
its distance from the main body in order to delay the hos- 
tile pursuit or to observe the enemy; and it then uses an 
increased gait to regain its distance. 

The distances of the rear guard from the main body and 
between the fractions of the rear guard are about the same 
as in an advance guard. If marching at night, the rear 
guard draws nearer the main body. As the main body seeks 
to withdraw from the enemy as rapidly as possible, while 
the rear guard endeavors to delay him and watch his move- 
ments, it is clear that the distance between the two bodies 
cannot be definitely prescribed. 

The commander of the rear guard should be a man of 
resolution and fertility of resources. He should constantly 
present a bold front to the enemy, and should ever be ready 
to fight, even to the extent of sacrificing himself and his 
entire command if necessary ; but he should remember that 
the great duty of the rear guard is to gain time, and he 
should know when to withdraw. He should be able to dis- 
tinguish the enemy's preparations for a serious attack from 



—47— 
insignificant demonstrations, and he should never allow the 
enemy to force him into a fight contrary to his own inter- 
ests and intentions. No other situation in combat demands 
so high an order of skill in troop leading as does the with- 
drawal from action under the pressure of the enemy's attack. 

The manner of withdrawing a rear guard from action 
depends entirely upon circumstances. As a rule, only a 
portion should withdraw at a time, taking up, if necessary, 
a new position, to cover the withdrawal of the rest. The 
guns, especially, must not all be withdrawn at once, as the 
total cessation of artillery fire would betray the movement. 
Whether the withdrawal should be by alternate squadrons 
or whether it should begin at the center or at a flank, de- 
pends upon the direction and progress of the attack and 
the topography of the field. Generally, a portion of the 
troops withdraw first, and when they are again in posi- 
tion or enroute, they are followed by the remaining troops. 
The withdrawal should never be a difficult matter if it has 
not been delayed too long. 

Patrolling must be carried on with vigilance and energy, 
especially on the flanks. The enemy, finding a firm front 
opposed to all his direct attacks, will undoubtedly attempt 
to cut in on the flanks, where, in fact, always lie his most 
promising hope of success. 

Cavalry Constituting a Part of an Infantry 

Rear Guard 

Generally speaking, cavalry constitutes a part of a 
rear guard: 

(a) When it is too weak to cover the withdrawal by acting- 
alone. 

(b) When the close proximity or aggressiveness of the pur- 
suing force makes the combined operations of infantry and cav- 
alry necessary to cover the withdrawal of the retreating force. 

(c) When other conditions, such as the character of the 
operations or the nature of the topography, make combined ac- 
tion preferable, or make independent cavalry operations imprac- 
ticable. 

(d) When a retreat is covered by army cavalry and the 
divisional or corps cavalry is attached to the rear guard for 
local reconnaissance and to keep in touch with the army 
cavalry. For the performance of this duty, if the cavalry is not 
a part of the rear guard, it is assigned its mission by the divis- 
ion or corps commander. 

In a mixed command, rear guard duty will usually fall 
to the lot of cavalry. For this duty cavalry is peculiarly 



—48— 
well fitted due to its ability to use fire power, to withdraw 
quickly from a dangerous situation, to use a variety of ac- 
tions, and to strike at the flanks. This does not mean that 
cavalry should consider itself tied to the rear of a slowly 
moving column. No other duty calls for greater activity. 
The mission is to protect the rear of the main body, and 
rapid action against an overbold or incautious enemy or a 
blow against his flanks will have far more moral and material 
effect than purely defensive action. Cavalry must use the 
mobility that is characteristic of the arm. 

The same general principles as to composition and 
strength govern in the organization of a composite rear 
guard as in a cavalry rear guard, with the exception that 
infantry is the predominating arm. If cavalry is available, 
it generally constitutes the entire support. In a large rear 
guard, units of all the auxiliary arms are attached. The 
distances between the different subdivisions of the rear 
guard are generally not as great as in a cavalry rear guard. 
However, in a composite rear guard the cavalry must be al- 
lowed great latitude in this respect, as it can close up with- 
out great difficulty. If in sufficient strength, the cavalry, 
assisted by the artillery and machine guns, is expected to 
offer the primary resistance to the advance of the pursuing 
force. The infantry of the rear guard only comes to the 
assistance when the cavalry is unable to hold the enemy at a 
safe distance. In the latter case the cavalry covers 
the withdrawal of the infantry and again takes up the bur- 
den of offering the first resistance to the pursuing force. 

The cavalry must profit to the utmost by the 
defensive features of the ground, and at every oppor- 
tunity take up a strong defensive position. The enemy will 
then have but two courses of action open to his choice, 
either to attack with the heads of his columns, or to deploy 
for action. If he chooses the former, his advanced troops 
should be easily repulsed ; if the latter, he will be compelled 
to lose time in deploying, while the rear guard (which should 
wait until the enemy's dispositions for attack are about 
completed) should quickly ploy and disappear from his 
front, only to repeat the operation at the next favorable 
ground. In the meantime, the enemy, unable to advance 
quickly in deployed lines, again loses time in changing to a 



—49— 

marching formation, and the main body of the retreating 
army steadily continues on its way without halting. 

Field Service Regulations, Par. 214, states: In the 
retreat the cavalry and artillery must be called on to make 
the greatest exertions and to suffer the heaviest losses 
where necessary to check the pursuit. The loss of men, 
horses and material must be unhesitatingly faced, if there be 
any gain thereby. 

In Field Service Regulations, Par. 56, we read 
"Machine guns are specially useful in the passage of defiles 
and in covering the crossing of rivers." 

The following points which apply primarily to a with- 
drawal from action should also be considered when deciding 
upon the use of machine guns with the rear guard cavalry. 

1. Good field of fire at long and effective ranges is more im- 
portant than at short range. 

2. Positions should be on flanks unless ground is suitable for 
overhead fire. 

3. Maximum fire power. Distribution in depth is not sought 
for. 

4. Covered lines of retreat in order that fire may be con- 
tinued to the last moment and yet allow withdrawal in safety. 

5. When more than one covering position is used, retirements 
will usually be by echelon. Distance of retirement to be long 
rather than short, to enable officers to occupy properly the new 
position, obtain firing data, etc. 

6. Surprise fire to be opened on enemy at short range if he 
be bold and aggressive. 

7. The probable loss of guns never to deter the machine gun- 
ners from remaining long enough to ensure the withdrawal of the 
main body. 

Machine rifles add materially to the fire power of the 
cavalry with a rear guard and should generally be assigned 
to units having the strength of a platoon or more. The posi- 
tion of the machine rifles with troops on rear guard duty 
will depend upon the character of the enemy's pursuit and 
the action contemplated. The rear point will rarely have oc- 
casion to dismount for more than a few minutes to return 
the fire of snipers. For this purpose the trooper's rifle 
should suffice. A rear party may expect to do more fighting 
and if the enemy's pursuit is light, a machine rifle squad 
may render great assistance. On the other hand, the ene- 
my's pursuit may be vigorous and both rear party and rear 
point may be driven in on the support. In such a case the 
machine rifles, retained with the support, will permit the 
most effective counter-measures to be taken. 



—50— 

Artillery, especially horse artillery, is extremely useful 
for delaying the enemy. In mixed commands some should 
be assigned to the rear guard. It is usually with the re- 
serve, although some may be with the support. 

A mounted section of engineers generally accompanies 
the cavalry and completes demolitions after all friendly 
troops have passed. The destruction of bridges is 
a most efficacious way of delaying the enemy, but care should 
be exercised not to cut off the retreat of the rear elements. 
Also, important bridges should not be destroyed without 
orders from the supreme commander unless closely pursued, 
as to do so may cause interference with his plans. It is 
usually sufficient merely to disable the important bridges by 
removing planking. 

The column is usually withdrawing from the enemy 
and reconnaissance is modified accordingly. The cavalry 
seeks to maintain contact with the enemy, not only with his 
advance troops but with his [main body as well. Its special 
duty in the way of reconnaissance is to cover the rear of the 
main body, not only on the road by which it is retreating, 
but on parallel roads ; so that the enemy while engaging the 
rear guard with a portion of its force cannot slip by it 
on a parallel road and strike the main body or cut off the 
retreat of the rear guard. 

If it is necessary to make a stand, one determined stand 
in a good position is usually preferable to several half- 
hearted ones. The cavalry may not be able to deceive the 
enemy more than once as to its strength. If it has a good 
position it should hold fast as long as it is safe. The cavalry 
should be kept as well in hand as conditions permit. All 
movements should be as simple as possible, and as far as 
practicable, straight to the rear. 

The spirit of the cavalry should be that of the attack. 
It should not confine itself to an indecisive passive defense 
but should assume the offensive whenever occasion offers, 
and should turn upon the pursuing enemy. 

When the main body halts, the cavalry at once 
establishes itself as a march outpost. As a rule very 
little change of position or formation will be called for. 
The point, reenforced if necessary from the advance party, 
immediately ocupies commanding positions on or near the 



—51- 
line of march providing good observation and defense, and 
continues energetic patrolling. 

When the pursuing force is composed of cavalry, the 
rear guard will fear especially for its flanks. The pursuing 
cavalry may push in vigorously against the rear guard on 
the line of march, but its chief concern will be to reach a 
flank position from which it can observe the main body of 
the retreating force and delay or disorganize it by sudden 
and determined attacks. It may further attempt to get 
between the main body and the rear guard and cut off the 
latter or drive it from the rear of the column. Therefore, 
the cavalry must reconnoiter well to the flanks and keep 
the commander of the forces informed of any movement 
toward that direction. 

Cavalry can charge bodies of the enemy that have 
been thrown into confusion by the pursuit, or by the fire 
of the artillery; but its chief reliance will be on dis- 
mounted fire action or a combination of mounted and dis- 
mounted action. It can take up almost any position that 
the infantry can, and thus compel the deployment and re- 
tardation of the enemy, while its superior mobility enables 
it to regain rapidly distance lost. Good cavalry of the 
American type is the life of a rear guard. 

Outposts 

Outposts are detachments thrown out from a force 
when halted, for the purpose of protecting it from surprise. 
Like advance guards on the march, outposts are charged 
with the duties of observation and resistance. They pre- 
vent the reconnaissance of the position by the enemy's 
scouts and patrols, give warning of the approach of hostile 
bodies, and offer sufficient resistance to the enemy's at- 
tacks to enable the main body to prepare for action. 

An outpost consists of stationary bodies of troops, oc- 
cupying a defensive line for the purpose of covering its own 
main body while at a halt. The majority of the troops on 
this duty remain in one place. Those performing outguard 
duty go only from their supports or other central body to 
their posts. While on this duty they are practically station- 
ary. Patrolling at night is more or less limited as to distance 
and can be better performed on foot. For short distances and 



—52— 
in a close country a mounted man is at a disadvantage be- 
cause his horse can toe seen and heard by the enemy at dis- 
tances much greater than can a dismounted man. Further- 
more, a mounted man can see no more than a dismounted 
man, and he cannot hear as much. Similarly, in daylight, a 
stationary post is somewhat handicapped by its mounts. The 
horses must be guarded and taken care of, and if possible, 
kept out of sight of the enemy's patrols, both on the ground 
and in the air, and protected from hostile air bombs and ma- 
chine guns. If the enemy is near, the mounts cannot be 
used for close in patrolling. 

It is a fundamental principle of the employment of cav- 
alry never to use it for a duty that can be better performed 
by dismounted troops when the latter are available. Ex- 
cept as explained in paragraphs under "Outpost Cavalry," 
outpost duty for an infantry command is not a legitimate 
function of cavalry, and its employment on this duty is a 
misuse and a waste of its strength. It can therefore be 
asumed that it will not be so used in the American Army. 

When cavalry is operating on an independent mission or 
is not under the protection of an infantry outpost, it must 
of course provide its own outposts. The discussion will, 
therefore, treat this subject under two headings: 

(a) Cavalry outpost, i.e., when covering its own cavalry. 

(b) When performing limited duties as a part of an infantry- 
outpost. 

Cavalry Outpost 

The halt order, issued by the commander of the main 
body, contains a paragraph prescribing the duties of the 
outpost. It generally prescribes the strength and compo- 
sition of the outpost and designates the general line of re- 
sistance. 

The principal duties of outposts are to give warning of 
the enemy's approach and to stop or delay his advance. 
They seek early information of the enemy's movements and 
endeavor to prevent reconnaissance by his patrols. 

In a brigade or smaller force the detail for outpost duty 
is generally made from the main body. The new outpost 
may become the rear guard the following day. When, as in 
large forces, an advance or rear guard performs such duty 
for several days, the outpost during this period is furnished 



—53— 
by such covering detachment, and orders for the establish- 
ment of the outpost are issued by the advance guard or 
rear guard commander. When the command is small and 
stationary for several days, the outpost is relieved daily. In 
large commands, the outpost will, as a rule, be relieved at 
intervals of several days. The period of outpost duty will 
largely depend on the severity of the service. 

The extent of the front and the strength needed for the 
line of resistance, as influenced by the nature of the country 
and other circumstances, usually determine the strength of 
the outpost. It must in any case be sufficient to furnish the 
troops deemed necessary on the line of resistance with suf- 
ficient additional strength to furnish the groups needed in 
the line of observation. It should be kept down to the low- 
est limits consistent with the performance of its duty, sel- 
dom exceeding one-sixth of the command. 

The outpost commander issues the outpost order, in 
which is prescribed the subdivision of the outposts, the lo- 
cation of the line of resistance, the position of the reserve, 
if any, and such special provisions for security and recon- 
naissance as are deemed necessary. 

An outpost is generally divided as follows : 

(a) A line of outguards, or observation groups. 

(b) A line of supports. 

(c) A reserve (in large outposts). 

The sentries, posted at favorable points but concealed 
as far as practicable, watch to their front and flanks and 
together with the outguards from which posted form the line 
of observation. The outguards, dismounted, are in the 
immediate vicinity, under cover. At night and in special 
cases double sentries may be posted. 

The supports form the line of resistance. They are 
posted on roads or other avenues of approach from the front, 
are dismounted and under cover, and strengthen their posi- 
tion by obstacles and intrenchments. 

When an outpost consists of a force larger than a squad- 
ron, it usually has a reserve. The reserve is generally in 
one body approximately in rear of the center of the line of 
supports. Its position is on a main road or avenue of hos- 
tile approach. It should be so located as to facilitate, its 
deployment on the line of resistance. 



—54— 

The supports must each have sufficient strength to fur- 
nish the strength needed on the line of resistance and to pro- 
vide men for patrol duty. Generally speaking, an outpost 
of one squadron or less would have, no reserve. In forces 
larger than a squadron about one-third to one-half might be 
held in reserve. 

The distances between fractions of outposts vary greatly 
according to circumstances, but ordinarily distances between 
the elements should not exceed those which can be covered 
by fire of the weapons of the outpost troops. In large com- 
mands the outpost should protect the main body from ar- 
tillery fire. This is impossible in small commands, the out- 
posts of which will seek to protect the main body from rifle 
and direct machine gun fire. The outposts are relieved 
every 24 hours, and the sentries every 2 hours or oftener. 

Sections of the outpost line are usually assigned to 
commanders who are held responsible for constant readi- 
ness for action and also for timely warning to the troops in 
rear. 

Machine guns and horse artillery with the outposts are 
located so as to sweep open spaces and lines of approach. 

Suitable arrangements must be made for feeding, wa- 
tering, and mess. 

Facilities for intercommunication must be developed to 
the fullest extent, and information from different sources 
must be forwarded without delay to superiors. The lines 
of information are established and operated by the same 
means as in an advance and rear guard. Due, however, to 
an outpost being stationary, the difficulties to overcome are 
not so great. More use can be made of wire lines. 

A large outpost is composed of all arms. Its functions 
are similar to those of an infantry outpost. 

Whether cavalry can have its field trains with it when 
on outpost depends largely on the character of the work of 
the previous day. If it has pushed far to the front and has 
been maneuvering and fighting against an active opposing 
cavalry the chances are that its field and combat trains 
cannot reach it. Cavalry habitually carries one day's grain 
and two days' rations on its horses. Each troop also car- 
ries on a pack animal a light field kitchen equipment and its 
picket line. Fires would almost never be permitted in ad- 



—55— 
vance of the supports, and those allowed would have to be 
carefully masked. Light spring wagons are most conven- 
ient in delivering cooked food to the men on outpost. When- 
ever any wheels at all can reach the command, cooking can 
be done well in rear and the spring wagons can be pushed 
forward under cover of night if necessary, even to the sup- 
ports. They can be withdrawn before daybreak and the men 
will have had two cooked meals. If the wagons remain dur- 
ing daylight, they must be placed under cover, particularly 
from air observation. 

The main body, and the reserve should there be one, 
must find concealment and shelter if possible. In camp or 
bivouac, if the enemy has effective aircraft, the only con- 
cealment is woods. In Europe billets may be available. A 
village offers better concealment for men and horses, better 
shelter, more rest, and, as a rule, better watering facilities. 
Billeting means, however, that men and horses are scat- 
tered. Therefore, the interior alarm system must be more 
accurately worked out. Every man in the command must 
understand where his alarm post is, whether with the horses 
or in the close defense of the village. 

Except for those patrols which are sent some distance 
in front of the line of observation and whose mission could 
best be performed mounted, the horses of cavalry on out- 
post duty should be assembled with the supports or reserve 
on troop picket lines where they can be unsaddled, groomed, 
and given proper feed and rest. Only when it is anticipated 
that the command will move before daylight is it justifiable 
to keep the animals saddled throughout the night. Usually 
cavalry in the field is anchored to its horses. The picket 
lines should therefore be so situated as to be behind .the line 
of defense which the commander intends to hold in case of 
enemy attack. 

When Performing Limiting Duties as Part of 
an Infantry Outpost 

The support of an infantry outpost may consist of in- 
fantry or cavalry, or both, or of cavalry and artillery, or 
of all three arms. The proportion of the different arms 
depends upon circumstances. In an open country, in day- 
time, the duty can be best performed by cavalry. In a 



—56— 
close country, at night, and when the enemy is near, in- 
fantry is preferable. The best performance of the duty 
requires a combination of the two arms. Cavalry occupies 
lookout stations too distant to be held by infantry, or pa- 
trols to a distance beyond the outpost that would be imprac- 
ticable for the latter arm. 

When cavalry is used with an outpost, it should be em- 
ployed in constant and vigilant patrolling as far to the front 
as may be consistent with reasonable precautions for safe- 
ty, but a squadron should not be used where a troop, or 
perhaps a few small patrols, could perform the duty equally 
well. If the duty of patrolling and occupying detached 
posts does not employ all the cavalry of the outpost, the 
rest should be held in hand by the outpost commander with, 
or near, the reserve, at a point on one of the main roads 
leading toward the enemy, whence it can be quickly sent 
forward in any emergency requiring its action. 



CHAPTER IV 
Cavalry Offensive Combat 



In the study of cavalry offensive combat one point 
should be made clear in the beginning. Cavalry must not be 
confused with mounted infantry. It must fight both moun- 
ted and dismounted. The cavalryman is armed with the 
rifle, pistol and saber. He must learn not only to use each 
of these weapons but to care for and us 3 his horse properly. 
The saber is used only mounted, the pistol either mounted or 
dismounted; but where either is used mounted, it is used 
in conjunction with the horse. The horse becomes a weapon 
also, not merely a means of transport. Mounted infantry 
is totally different. It is armed only with the rifle, always 
fights dismounted, and uses the horse solely as a method of 
transportation. 

Cavalry offensive combat will assume three phases — 
mounted action, dismounted action and a combination of the 
two. It is proposed to handle this subject from these stand- 
points. The desire is to give an idea of mounted and dis- 
mounted tactics and technique and better understanding as 
to how cavalry should be used under different conditions — 
mounted, dismounted, against cavalry and against infantry. 
It is impossible to enumerate all the situations that may 
arise. All that is hoped for is to make clear certain prin- 
ciples regarding the offensive use of cavalry. 

To understand the subject clearly we should first recall 
the mounted formations of the platoon, troop, squadron and 
regiment. 

The platoon is commanded by an officer with a noncom- 
missioned officer, or platoon sergeant, as second in command. 
The rank of the platoon is composed of two or more squads 
each of. which is commanded and led by its corporal. The 
platoon may be formed in line, in line of squads, in line of 
foragers or in column of fours, twos, or troopers. For com- 
bat two of its squads may be in its leading echelon, or all 

57 



—58— 
three squads may be formed on the same general line; or, 
it may attack in three waves or echelons with one squad in 
each. An additional sergeant is provided to have charge of 
the led horses when the platoon dismounts to fight on foot, 
and an additional private is provided as orderly for the pla- 
toon leader. 

The troop is composed of three rifle platoons and a ma- 
chine rifle platoon. The machine rifle platoon is similarly 
divided into squads, each of which is composed of two ma- 
chine rifle crews. The machine rifle platoon may be em- 
ployed as a unit to afford fire power while the remainder of 
the troop maneuvers mounted, or in conjunction with one 
or more of the dismounted rifle platoons. When the entire 
troop engages in dismounted combat, the machine rifle 
squads habitually join the rifle platoons, one machine rifle 
crew joining each flank squad of the rifle platoon. 

The troop may be formed in line, line of platoons or 
squads, or as foragers ; or in column of platoons, fours, twos, 
or troopers. It may deploy all three rifle platoons in one 
echelon, or with two platoons in the leading echelon and the 
other in a second wave or in support ; or in three waves or 
echelons with a platoon in each. 

All deployments are made fanwise, and the elements are 
led directly from their place in column to their position in 
line. Similarly all assemblies are quickly made by leading 
the elements directly to their positions in the designated 
formations. All such changes can be quickly accomplished 
by increases of gait. 

The changes in formation can be made quickly, espe- 
cially at increased gaits. The great beauty of the system is 
that the leader is truly a leader. He should never have to 
look over his shoulder, but he should always be watching 
his chief, the enemy, or the ground in front of him. In this 
way cavalry in the approach can take advantage of every 
concealment and defilade the ground affords. 

Formations to Decrease Vulnerability Under Fire 

Whenever it is necessary to cross a fire swept zone the 
commander of a body of troops must decide what formation 
will have the minimum vulnerability consistent with the 
necessary control of his unit. Regarded as an abstract propo- 



—59— 
sition (without considering terrain, space available, con- 
venience of subsequent employment, etc.), the formation 
which gives the minimum vulnerability will permit only the 
minimum control and vice versa. To illustrate — A line of 
foragers with wide intervals, is the least vulnerable of all 
battle formations and the most difficult to control. A solid 
column is the most vulnerable and the easiest to control. 
When under the fire of artillery, machine guns or rifles, a 
formation that has (continuous) depth is more vulnerable 
than one without depth, because a single bullet or projectile 
may go through several men and the enemy's errors in range 
are greater than his errors in deflection, making the disper- 
sion of his fire greater in depth than in breadth. Under 
artillery fire, a main consideration is to prevent the possi- 
bility of many men being put out by a single shell-burst. In 
many cases this has led to the adoption of a line of small 
columns with intervals between them. Even under artil- 
lery fire alone this formation is more vulnerable than a line 
of foragers, for it is easier to hit and a hit would put out 
more men. When used, it is because it is easier to control 
than a line of foragers and not because it is less vulnerable. 
Under observed fire, a body of troops, if advancing, is less 
vulnerable in echelon of columns than in line of columns, 
because it requires the enemy constantly to change both 
elevation and deflection. Under unobserved zone fire, the 
two formations are equally vulnerable, while the line of 
columns is easier to control and therefore preferable. 

Taking all these things into consideration we may list 
mounted battle formations in reverse order of vulnerability 
as follows: 

1. Line of foragers. 

2. Echelon of columns. 

3. Line of columns. 

4. Columns. 

In 2, 3 and 4 the vulnerability obviously increases with 
the strength of the columns. 

Mass is not considered because it is not a battle forma- 
tion. It is the most vulnerable of all. Line is not con- 
sidered because the terrain will seldom permit its use for 
any considerable distances. If used, it would be less vul- 
nerable than column and more vulnerable than foragers. 
Its comparative vulnerability to line of columns would de- 



—60— 

pend upon the length of the columns and the intervals be- 
tween them. 

In the formations just discussed we have been consider- 
ing the front line only. If the command were deployed in 
a succession of lines (formations), the same remarks as to 
vulnerability would apply to each of the successive lines. 

Speed is one of the main factors that lessen the vul- 
nerability of all these formations, but it does not affect 
their comparative vulnerability one to another. The great- 
er the speed, the fewer the casualties. It also increases the 
enemy's difficulties of ranging. 

In order to simplify the discussion of the comparative 
vulnerability of different formations, it has been necessary 
to leave out of consideration such things as cover afforded 
by the terrain, difficulties caused by the terrain, space avail- 
able for the command, the tactical mission of the command, 
etc. These are factors in every situation. The decision 
as to what formation to adopt is part of the tactical decision 
of the commander. The only general rule that can be fol- 
lowed is to move with as much speed as possible, and, espe- 
cially if under observed fire, use as irregular a formation as 
is consistent with proper control in order to outguess the 
enemy. 

The Mounted Attack 

Mounted action is used either in extended order or close 
order depending upon the character and formation of the 
enemy and the terrain. 

Extended order, that is, a formation as foragers, is us- 
ually used against dismounted troops, artillery and trains. 
It may also be used against mounted troops that are them- 
selves in extended order, or, with very small groups using 
pistols, against the hostile flanks. 

Close order is usually used against a mounted enemy 
in close order. 

When attacking dismounted troops the effect of the 
hostile fire is lessened by the extended order deployment. 
Such an attack is always made in successive waves or lines 
of foragers when it is possible. Small forces may have to 
attack in one line of foragers instead of in several succes- 
sive lines, but a single line is never as effective as several 
lines. 



—61— 
The reasons for selecting the mounted attack against 
dismounted troops, instead of the dismounted attack, must 
be based on the probability that the rapidity of movement 
across the fire swept area, thus reducing the time of ex- 
posure and the probability of hits on the swiftly moving tar- 
gets, will result in less losses than would occur in a dis- 
mounted attack on the same objective. This must always 
be a matter of judgment made more accurate by experience. 
The character and condition of the enemy, as well as the 
distance from him and the nature of the terrain, will have 
much weight. 

Against mounted troops dismounted action is danger- 
ous if the command is isolated. It permits the enemy to take 
full advantage of his mobility and to proceed by avoiding 
combat, or to gain the flanks or rear of the command. If 
these conditions are not considered disadvantageous, dis- 
mounted action may be resorted to when there is time, but 
it must be remembered that this method takes on the na- 
ture of defense instead of attack. If a mounted enemy does 
not choose to attack, nothing can be gained by attempting 
to attack him dismounted, because he will not wait to re- 
ceive such an attack. 

In the mounted attack against a mounted enemy, suc- 
cessive lines or waves are not practicable unless they follow 
preceding lines at such distances that they retain the power 
to maneuver so as to avoid piling up on the preceding lines. 
If a preceding line charges and is successful, the enemy re- 
tires and there is no need for succeeding lines to charge 
over the same ground. If the preceding line is unsuccessful, 
it must retire to a flank and must have space to be able to 
do this without blocking the advance of a succeeding line 
over the same ground. A sufficient distance must be provid- 
ed, therefore, to give succeeding lines room to maneuver, 
or unsuccessful lines room to retire. This applies especially 
when attacking with the pistol, but is also important when 
using the saber. It does not apply when attacking dis- 
mounted troops. 

The several units may be echeloned on each other, and 
the whole attacking echelon may be followed by a reserve at 
such distance that it can retain freedom to maneuver in any 
direction. 



—62— 

In narrow spaces such as inclosed roads or denies, it 
may be necessary to attack with extremely narrow fronts. 
In such cases it is better to launch to the attack very small 
units in succession rather than to charge with a large force 
in a single column. The size of the force selected for each 
successive charge will depend upon the space for deploy- 
ment. The succeeding units should march well on one side 
of the road or defile so as to allow the charging units if re- 
pulsed to retire without throwing succeeding units into dis- 
order. If a unit is successful in its charge there is no need 
for succeeding units to do more than follow it up closely. 

As to the pistol and saber, recent developments have 
shown the pistol to be a very powerful and useful weapon in 
close order as well as in extended order. It is probable, 
therefore, that the saber will be employed as a sort of re- 
serve weapon, to be used if the pistol cannot be utilized or if 
ammunition is exhausted. When attacking in successive 
lines, with distances less than 150 yards, it will be necessary 
to use the saber in the succeeding lines, the first line only 
using pistols. In units as large as a troop or larger, the dis- 
tances between the several lines or waves would seldom be 
less than 150 yards, so that either pistol or saber could be 
used. The state of training and confidence of the men in 
one or the other of the two weapons should determine which 
is more advantageous. 

Undulating ground, if not too broken by serious ob- 
stacles, is the best for mounted attacks as it affords shelter 
and does not impede the force of the attack. But cavalry 
can attack mounted over almost any kind of ground not cov- 
ered with artificial obstacles such as wire entanglements. 
If the ground is too broken for close order movements, ex- 
tended order may be and usually is quite feasible. Ground 
that is too rough or broken for saber attacks is often quite 
suitable for pistol attacks. 

The front required for the attack as foragers will limit 
such an attack to forces no larger than a troop because of 
the difficulty of control. The troop extended as foragers will 
cover nearly 300 yards of front. If the terrain permits 
the deployment of more than one troop in line, all the major 
can do is leave the control of each troop to its captain, indi- 
cating to him his objective and mission. With the squadron 



—63— 
the simplest form of open order attack will be in successive 
lines of foragers, each line composed of one troop led by its 
captain. The major indicates the objective and the dis- 
tance at which the successive lines are to follow the leading 
troop. In such an attack each line after attacking rallies 
to a flank as quickly as possible to avoid the fire of the line 
which follows or continues on to other assigned objectives 
in rear. In every case, though, the major holds out a re- 
serve, which retains close formation as long as possible. 

In the charge the horse really becomes a weapon if the 
enemy is not protected by some obstacle preventing violent 
collision. To be successful in the pistol attack, the troopers 
must be trained in accuracy in firing to the front, in rapidity 
of loading, and in withholding their fire until within close 
range of the enemy. The ability to handle and control 
their horses is essential to either case. Pistol attacks in 
close order are quite as feasible as saber attacks, and with 
trained troops are very formidable. 

Cavalry Against Cavalry 

Let us consider first the action of cavalry against 
cavalry. This will usually consist of mounted and 
dismounted action, although combats of small forces, 
squadrons or less, will more frequently consist of mounted 
action. 

There is no such thing as a normal attack. The situa- 
tion in each case will determine the formation and method. 
However, in every mounted attack there will be a primary 
articulation into an attacking echelon and a reserve. The 
relative strength of the attacking echelon and of the reserve 
will depend upon the situation, the size of the force attack- 
ing, whether acting alone or as part of a larger force. In 
the case of a platoon, one or more squads may be held in 
support; in a troop one or more platoons may be held in 
support ; in a squadron one or more troops may form the re- 
serve. Ordinarily, the bulk of the troops will be in the at- 
tacking echelon. 

The attacking echelon may attack in one line or in suc- 
cessive lines or waves. The method will be indicated as a 
rule, but in many cases the leader of the unit designated 
for the attacking line may have to use his own judgrnent 



—64— 

and so conduct his unit as to meet the particular situation. 
The reserve will follow the attacking echelon at from 100 to 
400 yards. No set rule can be laid down. The distance will 
vary in every case depending upon terrain, condition of 
the horses, position of the enemy and so forth. Its func- 
tion is to follow in such a position in rear as to support best 
the attacking line, to meet a counter-attack, or to press 
a pursuit as the occasion demands. 

In mounted attacks the endeavor should be to strike 
the enemy in flank. For this purpose a unit may be 
specifically designated for the flank attack. This is in 
addition to the reserve. Its leader should so conduct 
it as to fall opportunely upon the enemy's flank. At times 
a unit may be designated to guard against a flank attack 
or an enveloping attack by the enemy, when either can be 
definitely foreseen. This, too, is in addition to the re- 
serve. If no unit is assigned the duty of guarding against 
flank attacks, it devolves upon the reserve. 

Except in small forces it will be usual that the best suc- 
cess against mounted troops can be attained by deploying 
the attacking echelon into two or more waves with sufficient 
distances to permit maneuver, or the several waves being 
echeloned on each other. The succeeding waves, being echel- 
oned or following the preceding ones at maneuvering dis- 
tances, protect the flanks of preceding waves and outflank 
enemy resistances, which may check the advance of the 
leading wave. The reserve will be charged with protecting 
the flanks of the entire attacking echelon, of striking the 
deciding blow in a close contest, of engaging in the pursuit 
of a defeated enemy, or of forming the rallying point about 
which the assaulting echelon may reorganize in case of de- 
feat. 

In units larger than the platoon the leader can gen- 
erally only indicate the objective, unless the latter is obvious, 
designate the limits of the attack and state the special mis- 
sions assigned to each line or wave, and in some cases the 
weapon to be employed. There is scarcely time for more 
detailed orders. Under some circumstances only commands 
or signals can be utilized. In any case not specifically cov- 
ered each leader must use his own discretion. This applies 
to the elements of the attacking line as well as to the support 
and reserve. 



—65— 

In combat of cavalry against cavalry, mounted action 
is the thing to be sought, and dismounted action should 
never be resorted to if mounted action is at all feasible. 
Every commander should consider the feasibility of mounted 
action before deciding on dismounted action. It is prob- 
able that the mounted action of large bodies of greater 
strength than the squadron will rarely be resorted to in the 
future, although mounted attacks of up to 1,000 men were 
made during The World War. Mounted attacks of small 
bodies will be frequent. "In the mounted charge of one 
cavalry force against another, the one attacking with the 
greater determination and entering the collision with the 
more violent impetus, combining velocity and cohesion, will 
be successful. Officers and men must have a firm resolve 
to crush the enemy's lines by riding down whatever con- 
fronts them. Good cavalry must be able to charge re- 
peatedly. It should be taught to rally quickly behind 
its leader in response to trumpet call or command. It 
is only when the horses are thoroughly trained and hardened 
and kept in fresh and vigorous condition that cavalry can 
satisfy all the demands of mounted combat. To arrive at 
the charging point with horses in a distressed, blown and 
unsteady condition would be to sacrifice the most important 
element of success — vigor and cohesion in the shock." 

The side that shows the determination to stay mounted 
and close on the enemy has a great moral superiority. Cav- 
alry which believes it is helpless on its horses and must dis- 
mount every time hostile cavalry is encountered will lack 
the necessary punch. It might seem that when two mount- 
ed forces meet the side that dismounts first will have the 
advantage. This is not necessarily so. The charging 
line may turn and ride around the dismounted enemy if the 
latter has had time to get his firing organized. If he has 
not had time to get his firing line organized, he may 
be caught when dismounting and the charge go over him 
with much damage and comparatively little loss to the charg- 
ing line. The dismounted side then has the burden of 
getting back to its led horses or to its friends with you 
between him and them. The side dismounted has always 
the responsibility of protecting its led horses. With the 
mounted side the opportunity is always present of getting 



—66— 
through to the led horses, either by direct attack or by man- 
euver, and placing the dismounted enemy afoot, 

Every effort should be made to keep the enemy in 
doubt as to the direction of the main attack, to strike him 
in flank or in an oblique direction combined with envelop- 
ment. Favorable opportunity for mounted attack will be 
presented if the hostile cavalry can be caught while emerging 
from a defile, when it can be caught in column, in the act 
of changing formation, when it can be taken in flank and 
in general when it cannot quickly deploy equivalent forces 
to meet an attack. 

The led horses of the opposing dismounted cavalry 
are always a desirable objective. However, the leader 
must always consider whether the capture or driving off 
of the led horses will be of greater advantage than the dam- 
age that may be done to the dismounted opponent by attack- 
ing him in front or flank. In other words, the attack of the 
led horses must not be allowed to assume undue prominence 
to the neglect of the dismounted elements. It may be 
advisable at times to seek out the led horses thereby plac- 
ing the enemy afoot if such an action will nullify the 
future efforts of the opposing cavalry. However, gen- 
erally speaking, efforts should not be concentrated on the led 
horses unless their whereabouts are known definitely and 
their loss to the enemy will have a decisive effect. The 
protection of his led horses is always a source of worriment 
to the dismounted cavalry leader, frequently needlessly so. 
Their capture may have as much effect as an attack on the 
dismounted elements and much less loss. The effect which 
will be produced must be the controlling factor. 

Scouts. — During the approach march and the ad- 
vance, cavalry should be preceded by covering patrols or 
scouts who will observe for the enemy, select suitable route 
according to the terrain, open fences and otherwise assist 
and expedite the forward progress of the assaulting units. 
When the final advance begins which will terminate in the 
collision of the opposing forces, these scouts or covering pa- 
trols are absorbed in the assaulting echelon. The distance 
at which they will precede the command will vary with the 
terrain, the proximity of the enemy, and the nature of the 
attack which is to be delivered. Specially trained scouts 



—67— 
from the leading elements of the command should be em- 
ployed for the purpose. 

Combat Patrols. — In addition to the scouts, cav- 
alry about to engage in combat will need combat patrols 
to provide for the immediate security of the flank or rear. 
They are limited in numbers and strength to the minimum. 
When required it is the duty of the immediate commander 
of the attacking line to see that combat patrols are provided. 

In the squadron or larger forces it will be necessary 
to combine mounted action with dismounted fire action; 
the mounted action being the deciding factor and the dis- 
mounted action forming a pivot of maneuver. Similar 
action may be taken with the troop. In the combined 
mounted and dismounted attack, the dismounted elements 
form a pivot of maneuver which holds up the enemy or 
causes him to deploy, while the mounted attack strikes him 
in flank. Machine guns are especially valuable in this use 
as also are the machine rifles. 

Dismounted Action 

Cavalry can dismount from one-fourth to all of its 
strength depending upon whether its horses are to be left 
mobile or immobile. By mobile is meant that the horses 
can be moved from one place to another rapidly and with- 
out confusion by leading. This means that sufficient per- 
sonnel must be left as horse-holders to handle the animals 
and lead them. One man can easily handle and lead three 
horses besides his own. Horses are immobile when they 
cannot be moved rapidly or quickly from one place to an- 
other. Mobility enables the horses to be quickly moved 
from one place to another, but it has the objection that it 
involves withdrawing a large percentage of the troops from 
the dismounted firing line. The advantages and disadvan- 
tages of immobility are just the reverse. 

As a rule troops are dismounted for dismounted action 
from column of fours, although they may be dismounted 
from any formation. The leader either gives instructions 
as to the dispositions of the led horses and the men still re- 
maining mounted, or in the absence of such instructions, 
the noncommissioned officer in charge of the led horses dis- 
poses of them in such a manner as to facilitate rapid mount- 



—68— 
ing and in the best cover available in the immediate vi- 
cinity. Frequently they will have to be moved, but, unless 
it is necessary, they must not be moved beyond the imme- 
diate protection of the firing line. The horses should be 
kept as close to the firing line as cover and concealment 
will permit. 

When the horses are left mobile only 75% of the total 
number of rifles is made available, but this method will be 
adopted invariably where it is desired to form a firing line 
hastily, or when the leader desires to be able to maneuver 
quickly. This demands that the horses be kept close up so 
as to be available quickly, also that they be so faced as to 
facilitate quick mounting and movement away ; that is, they 
should be so faced that a unit can at once be moved in the 
desired direction upon mounting. In offensive action this 
method of dismounting will be almost invariably the rule. 

On the other hand if it is desired to use the entire fire 
power of the unit, it will be necessary to immobilize the 
horses. This may be done by coupling horses head and 
tail or by linking them in circle. Either method enables 
the leader to place his entire strength on the firing line but 
reduces the maneuvering ability. The disadvantages are 
that the horses are tied down to one place. They form a 
prominent target, especially to aircraft, unless carefully 
hidden. If discovered, they cannot be moved readily. 
This method will be adopted more frequently in the defen- 
sive but there is no invariable rule. The situation itself 
will determine the method in every case. 

In almost every case a guard will be necessary for the 
led horses. This is true especially in the action of cavalry 
against cavalry. The cavalry leader must always consider 
the protection of his led horses. In the case of a troop 
operating alone the troop commander is responsible. If 
the troop is in squadron, this duty develops upon the 
squadron commander. The size of the guard is so de- 
pendent upon the situation that no rule as to its size can 
be laid down. Only a few men may be required in one case 
whereas another case may demand a proportionately greater 
strength. 

Constant reconnaissance both to the front and flanks 
is essential. Where possible this should be done mounted. 



—69— 
The reconnaissance should be pushed well out to the front 
and flank rather than to the flank and rear. 

The dismounted action of cavalry will approximate 
closely that of infantry. It may almost be said that cavalry 
dismounted action can be divided into two characters; one 
the cavalry character and the other the infantry character. 
In the first instance cavalry may find itself on the flank of 
a column, opposed by a light detachment holding a defile 
or an approach, opposed by hostile dismounted cavalry, or 
in any situation in which speed and quick fire power are 
necessary to make up for its lack in numbers. In any such 
situation it should deploy on a comparatively wide front, 
putting as many rifles into the firing line as it can, while 
keeping its horses mobile. Only small local supports are 
held out and the greatest possible fire power is developed 
in the shortest time possible. The reserve is kept mounted 
and mobile. If this is not sufficient to drive the enemy in the 
direction chosen, it can disengage itself and try from another 
direction. Or it can develop as much fire power as possible 
utilizing a mounted fraction to gain the flank or rear. Its 
main value, that of rapid maneuver, due to its mobility, 
should never be lost sight of. Cavalry should be impressed 
that it should never deliberately enter into a fire fight if 
there is any possible chance of accomplishing its task by 
maneuver. 

Every cavalry leader of whatever grade must always 
view each tactical situation that confronts him with the 
idea of maneuvering to accomplish his task. The endeavor 
should always be made to gain the flank or rear of his 
opponent, be he cavalry or infantry. 

Cavalry can operate on a wider front relatively and 
in a more dispersed formation than infantry. The main 
reason for this is that it will not be called upon for the long 
sustained effort that usually falls to the infantry. There- 
fore, there is not the same need for reserves. The bulk 
of its forces should be placed in the attacking line. The 
infantry, when present, must be considered as the ultimate 
reserve. Cavalry's lack of depth must be compensated for 
by its mobility and power of maneuver. The effort should 
be made to deploy so as to bring a converging effect to its 
fire and a consequent divergence to that of the enemy. Com- 



—70— 
manders should not hesitate to leave wide intervals in their 
lines in the initial deployment, provided conditions are fav- 
orable and a mounted reserve can be kept close at hand. 

It is almost an invariable rule that cavalry attacking 
dismounted should hold out a mounted reserve. This is 
true especially in the dismounted action of cavalry against 
cavalry. This reserve is necessary to meet a mounted 
attack of the hostile cavalry, if one should develop, and to 
take prompt advantage of any success that may be attained. 

The principal value of cavalry dismounted action is 
in its ability to form quickly a firing line by reason of its 
mobility and the speed by which it is capable of doing this. 
It should remain mounted as long as possible, dismounting 
as close to the front selected for the attack as the terrain 
permits. When dismounted it should advance to the attack 
as does infantry. It should move in column or line of col- 
umns until exposure to hostile fire demands a deployment. 
Small supports will be held out, but as a general rule the 
effort should be made to get as many rifles as possible 
on the firing line in order to secure the necessary fire power. 
This means a line of skirmishers at wide intervals with 
supports in column or line of small columns as long as 
possible, on until necessary to incorporate them in the firing 
line or to deploy as skirmishers to avoid losses. 

In the infantry character, where cavalry finds itself 
opposed by heavy resistance and with little opportunity to 
maneuver, it can well take a page from the infantry note 
book and attack well distributed in depth, with its front lines 
thinly deployed and its supports and reserves in small mobile 
columns. It must have the same covering and supporting 
fire from artillery and machine guns as the infantry. If 
a deliberate attack is called for, its formation should be 
similar to that of the infantry. The line will be pushed 
forward by rushes or by infiltration, and every effort made 
to close with the enemy as soon as possible. The cavalry 
has no bayonet, but it is believed that the pistol can take the 
place of the bayonet when the time comes for its use. 
Ordinarily cavalry should not be called upon for this pur- 
pose. "One arm should never be used for a. job for which 
another arm is better fitted if it can be avoided." 



—71— 

It must be remembered that cavalry cannot produce 
as many rifles as a corresponding body of infantry. For 
example, the troop can produce a little more than the 
strength of an infantry platoon, the squadron a little more 
than the strength of a company, a regiment a little less than 
the battalion. 

The cavalry squadron is the attack unit that corres- 
ponds to the infantry battalion. The major designates 
the troops to form the assaulting echelon and those to con- 
stitute the reserve. He may designate the size of the troop 
supports to be held out. He orders the deployment and 
conducts the approach march to conform to conditions of 
mission and terrain. His reserve gives him a weapon to 
protect his flanks, to meet counter-attacks, to initiate 
pursuits, or to cover defeat. He makes provision to cover 
his flanks but this in no way lessens the responsibility of 
any troop commander who finds himself with an exposed 
flank. 

The lack of depth and the necessity for surprise fire 
point to the vital necessity for careful training in mus- 
ketry in order to obtain the maximum effect from the com- 
paratively few rifles in the firing line. Vacillating skir- 
mishing, which produces little effect, is to be avoided. The 
fire attack must be pushed forward with vigor. 

Quickness in dismounting, in moving horses to shelter, 
and in opening an accurate, well distributed fire of the maxi- 
mum volume, combined with mobility and maneuver, are 
characteristics of good cavalry in dismounted action. 

In the attack it is sometimes necessary to designate a 
base unit. The other units conform but their penetration 
is not regulated by that of the base. The penetration of one 
must facilitate the advance of another, precisely as with in- 
fantry. In a similar manner reinforcements should be sent 
in where the going is good, not where it is difficult. 

Large bodies of cavalry will have artillery attached 
to them. It may, by its fire, limit or hinder the maneuvering 
of hostile bodies in the rear which might endanger the attack. 
As artillery will only be attached to larger bodies of cavalry 
its greatest employment will be in the pivot of maneuver to 
support either the dismounted attack, the mounted man- 
euver, or both. In the conflict of cavalry against cavalry, 



—72— 
artillery will have greater need for immediate and close 
protection because of the mobility of the enemy and the 
gaps in the line. There will probably be many chances for 
small hostile bodies to filter through and approach close to 
the guns whose attention will be devoted probably to bigger 
things. The principal defense of cavalry against hostile ar- 
tillery fire will be concealment and speed of movement. 

Machine guns and machine rifles greatly augment the 
fire power of cavalry. There are many who believe that the 
number of automatic firing weapons should be increased ma- 
terially. Both machine guns and machine rifles will be 
useful in forming pivots of maneuver which by their fire 
can cause the deployment or arrest the progress of the enemy 
while the mounted attack maneuvers to strike him in flank. 
Cavalry machine guns must fight well forward and without 
over regard to their loss. This is probably the main differ- 
ence between infantry and cavalry machine guns. They 
must rely upon their mobility to get away or to move from 
one position to another when the time comes. If high 
ground can be secured, machine guns can be utilized for 
fire over the heads of the attacking line almost to the moment 
of the mounted clash. They can then be turned on the 
formed enemy bodies in rear which constitute the greatest 
menace to cavalry's mounted attack. 

The combat trains of infantry are almost invariably 
with the unit to which they belong. With cavalry this dis- 
position will be the case less frequently, especially if long 
and rapid marches are to be made. In such cases the combat 
trains are generally combined and directed to probable 
places of need. The individual cavalryman can carry a 
greater amount of ammunition that the infantryman, as 
part of it can be carried on the horse. 

The advance of large bodies may be on one road or 
several roads, depending upon the ease of marching and con- 
ditions of subsistence, forage and water. In large bodies, 
parallel roads should be used whenever possible, but when 
combat is imminent the command must concentrate; that 
is, the columns must be near enough to each other to insure 
co-operation. 

When combat is imminent the command should be 
closed up and so disposed as to be ready for instant action, 



—73— 
generally a line of short columns with deploying intervals, 
combined with such echelons as may be necessary to oppose 
flank attacks and to provide a support and a reserve. Such 
a formation should be adopted as will give the necessary 
elasticity to pass over uneven ground, take advantage of 
cover and effect a rapid deployment. The idea of man- 
euvering to accomplish the mission must ever be present, 
although when occasion demands cavalry must be prepared 
to fight as hard and as long as infantry. 

The action of the cavalry on the western front during 
The World War up to the time the lines became stabilized 
was typical of the action incident to the earlier days of any 
war. The German advance was covered by a swarm of 
cavalry. Mounted and dismounted action was of frequent 
occurrence. The offensive combat of cavalry was well 
exemplified in the Palestine campaign. 

Let us depict the advance of an army with its front 
covered by a large mass of cavalry. The picture we will 
have is that of a thin screen of small detachments and 
patrols well to the front supported by successively larger 
elements in rear, culminating in a large central mass known 
as the reserve. Each will be screening the movement 
of the army in its rear and endeavoring to pierce the screen 
in its front. The defeat of the hostile cavalry will be the 
prime mission. There will result, combat of cavalry 
against cavalry, of small and large bodies, mounted and 
dismounted, and both. The charge of small bodies will 
be frequent, of troops less frequent, of squadrons oc- 
casionally, of regiments or larger bodies seldom if ever. 
The larger bodies in rear will be called on from time to time 
to threatened parts of the line or to resist an advance of 
the enemy's cavalry. Again they will be called upon to 
furnish the necessary driving power to force a way through 
the hostile cavalry. This will require maneuvering ability 
and mobility. The value of cavalry is dependent upon 
its mobility and its fire power; mobility to arrive quickly 
at the designated scene of action, to maneuver, to spread 
out over wide spaces if necessary, or, after striking a blow, 
to escape from superior numbers of the enemy, to cross 
rapidly fire swept zones so as to present a difficult target, 
and to arrive, without destructive losses, at close quarters 



—74— 

with the enemy; fire power to take full advantage of the 
situation in which its mobility has placed it. Maximum 
mobility and maximum fire power are incompatible. Of 
the two, mobility is of more importance. 

This strongest and most useful attribute of cavalry — 
mobility — is easily destroyed by ill-considered, unnecessary 
and indefinite missions. Widespread tasks of recon- 
naissance to undetermined places to seek indefinite infor- 
mation, merely in accordance with some formula for the use 
of cavalry is certain to waste away the strength of the arm 
and to immobilize it without accomplishing any useful 
result. Care must be taken to avoid frittering away a 
cavalry command. The bulk should be held intact and 
used as a mass. While cavalry should be able to respond 
to any demand placed upon it, care must be taken that this 
demand will not be such as to exhaust prematurely the 
animals. Mobility and efficiency of a mounted organiza- 
tion depend upon the condition of the horses. 

Personal reconnaissance by the commander is essen- 
tial whether the contemplated action is to be mounted or 
dismounted. He should always be well to the front, ac- 
companied by several staff officers and if possible by the 
leaders of the principal subordinate units. During the 
approach march he should go to some point where he can 
see the ground over which his command may be launched 
in the attack. Nothing can take the place of a personal re* 
connaissance. However, inadequate knowledge of the 
ground should never cause the commander to hesitate to send 
his troops into action in case of emergency. 

It is no disparagement to the other arms to state that 
cavalry leaders must have special qualifications. The 
speedy course of a cavalry battle with its sudden changes 
requires special qualities. The leader must be vigorous 
and active ; he must have good judgment, a firm will, sound 
tactical knowledge and be a man of quick decision. The 
latter is important for his decision must be made quick- 
ly or his chance is lost. Where the infantry leader has 
minutes to decide the cavalry leader has seconds. Further- 
more he must be able to express himself in brief and clear 
orders. 



CHAPTER V 
Cavalry Defensive Action 



The Field Service Regulations class defensive action as : 

1. Passive defense. 

2. The defense seeking a favorable decision. 

A passive defense is defined as one in which the object 
is to avoid giving the enemy a decision, and in which the 
idea of offensive combat is absent. The term "defense 
seeking a favorable decision" is self-explanatory. There 
are two types of passive defense, each of which is frequently 
adopted by cavalry. As the method of handling the de- 
fensive in each case is in many respects different it is es- 
sential to understand the distinction. One — termed the 
purely passive defense — is that in which a stubborn and pro- 
tracted resistance is contemplated. Examples of this type 
are; seizing and holding a position until the arrival of the 
infantry; holding the crossing over some obstacle — holding 
an isolated position. The other, which may be termed 
the temporary passive defense, is that in which the resis- 
tance contemplated is temporary, a withdrawal generally 
being made with the idea of taking up another position 
or positions further to the rear. The best example of 
this type is the delaying action. 

Instances of cavalry acting on the defensive and seeking 
a favorable decision occur most frequently when one portion 
of the command takes the defensive (pivot of maneuver) 
while the other seeks an opportunity for offensive action. 

A passive defense is of course undertaken only when 
circumstances force it. In the defense seeking a favor- 
able decision, the defensive may be voluntarily assumed 
hy a part of the troops while the remainder seeks an oppor- 
tunity of assuming the offensive later, at the most advan- 
tageous time. Action against the flank or flanks of the 
enemy is then most often indicated. 

75 



—76— 
In true defense, cavalry fights only dismounted. When 
cavalry is mounted, it knows only the mounted attack 
and has no defensive power. Instances of firing mounted to 
check advancing infantry or cavalry are quoted, but they are 
rare. The only conception of a mounted defensive is one 
in which troops, by withdrawing mounted, entice a pur- 
suing enemy under the fire of machine guns, or of artillery 
or of a dismounted firing line. 

The Defensive Position 

A position defended by effective rifle, or rifle and 
machine gun fire, may be made so strong in front that it can 
be held by a comparatively small force against a frontal 
attack. 

The weakness of the defense by dismounted cavalry 
lies in the flanks and in the necessity of protecting the led 
horses. 

In a purely passive defense, an essential requirement 
of a good position is not only a clear field of fire to the front 
and exposed flanks for several hundred yards, but also that 
combat groups be so located that they can mutually support 
each other by effective flanking and cross fire. The length 
of front should be suited to the size of the command, and 
the location should be such that the enemy must attack or 
abandon his plans. Obstacles along the front, cover for 
supports and reserves, and good facilities for communica- 
tion in rear are highly desirable. Impassable obstacles 
on the flanks add greatly to the strength of the position. 
Cover from view for the led horses as well as cover from 
hostile fire should be sought. Particularly is this so if the 
enemy possesses superiority in the air and it is desired to 
hold the horses immobile. In a temporary passive defense, 
as many of the above requirements as are possible should 
be secured. A good field of fire at long ranges is absolute- 
ly essential, and especial attention should be paid to obtain- 
ing cover for the led horses close to the firing line and to 
routes of withdrawal, good get-aways. 

In the "defense seeking a favorable decision" all the 
foregoing requirements are desirable, except at times the 
obstacles. In the selection of a position it is well to have 
the position held by the troops on the defensive (the pivot 



—77^ 
of maneuver) offer the troops acting on the offensive an 
opportunity to maneuver without coming under fire and 
under viqw of the enemy. If the position does not accom- 
plish this, some concealment prior to the maneuver is desir- 
able. 

In the selection of a position in all the foregoing cases, 
proper places for the artillery and machine guns are to 
be considered. Frequently the securing of these places 
is the controlling factor in the selection. 

Occupation of the Position 

In considering the occupation of a defensive position 
by cavalry the following principles must be borne in mind : 

(i) The squadron is a tactical unit best suited to indepen- 
dent assignment and to carry on the fire fight. 

(2) The deployment is not in a continuous line but in groups, 
with wide and varying intervals, and with these groups so dis- 
posed as to utilize to the best advantage the inequalities of the 
ground. The better the field of fire, the wider is the interval 
between groups. 

(3) The occupation is in relatively greater width and corres- 
pondingly less depth than in an infantry force of the same size. 

An exception to number 3 above occurs in case stubborn 
resistance is contemplated; as for instance holding a posi- 
tion until the arrival of infantry (purely passive defense). 
Here the horses would normally be rendered immobile and 
held well to the rear, and the occupation would be similar 
to that of infantry. 

If the action is to be broken off before the troops are 
seriously engaged, the horse furnishes a means of prompt 
abandonment of the position without the difficulty that 
would be experienced by infantry thus extended. The 
additional width of the position secures additional fire 
power, while the mounted reserve permits a quick rein- 
forcement of a threatened point. 

It is a recognized military principle that the number 
of men required to defend a position depends less on its 
front than on the facility of access to the various portions 
of it. Bearing this principle in mind, it is readily seen 
why cavalry, with the mobility the horse affords, is just- 
ified in occupying a much wider front than a correspond- 
ing force of infantry. 



—78— 

Time permitting — a reconnaissance to select the posi- 
tion, and afterward of the selected position, is made. This 
includes the determination of suitable locations for the 
machine guns and artillery. The commander then assigns 
to his subordinates the front to be occupied by their com- 
mands. These, in turn, subdivide the front among the 
next lower units of their commands. 

In the larger commands the front is usually divided 
into sectors and a regiment assigned to each; the colonel 
assigning to squadrons portions of the sector allotted to 
regiments. The major locates such fire, communicating 
and cover trenches and obstacles as are to be constructed. 
He assigns troops to construct them and details troops 
to occupy them. 

When time and means are available the position should 
be fortified. This work will usually be limited to the sim- 
plest means, such as demolitions, obstructions and construc- 
tion of rifle pits or sections of fire trench. Buildings and 
walls heavy enough to afford protection against rifle fire 
and shrapnel may be included in the line of defense, es- 
pecially if they extend the view and enlarge the field of fire. 

The most effective protection against artillery fire is 
concealment. Every effort should be made to secure it 
and to deceive the enemy as to the location of the main 
defenses. If possible the position should be viewed from 
the direction of the enemy to ascertain whether the measures 
for invisibility and deception are effective. Ranges should 
be measured and marked, and troops made familiar with 
the distances. 

The reconnaissance and assignments to position hav- 
ing been completed, the command is moved as close to the 
position as circumstances permit. The mounted command 
should not be exposed to view if avoidable, and the possi- 
bilities of becoming exposed to the indirect fire of hostile 
artillery or machine guns must be considered. 

When the horses are to be held mobile, the command, 
having moved forward, is dismounted, and the horse-holders 
take the horses to the rear and place them under such cover 
from view and from fire as may be available. When the 
horses are to be held immobile, it is well to dismount at the 
points they are to be held and to march the rest of the way 



—79— 
to the position. If an immediate occupation of the position 
is necessary, the command may be moved mounted as close to 
the position as is advisable, and the horses may be led to 
the desired position in rear. Such of the horse-holders as 
are not needed with the immobilized horses then rejoin the 
command. 

If cover from fire is not available in rear of the firing 
line, the led horses should be echeloned in rear of the flanks 
in order to escape the effects of hostile fire directed at the 
dismounted firing line. They should be held in groups 
corresponding to those of their riders and if mobile should 
be so disposed that when mounted they can be moved at 
once in what is presumed will be the desired direction. 
Locations readily accessible are sought for the led horses. 
These locations and the routes thereto should be definitely 
known by the group commanders and by the groups, and 
no change made in them without immediate notification 
being furnished to the group commander concerned. In 
the purely passive defense, the horses are normally held 
immobile and well away from the contemplated action. 

The commander who decides to undertake a serious 
fire action must realize that by dismounting he has severed 
his connection with his horses for a very considerable time. 
He will find himself in error should he anticipate that after 
having become deeply engaged the fight can be readily 
broken off and the horses remounted without serious loss 
to the defending force. Experience in the Palestine cam- 
paign showed that when the enemy possesses airplanes, 
even without superiority in the air, immobilizing the 
horses by coupling or by circling is impracticable. Over- 
head cover must be secured or the horses held mobile. 

In defensive situations, other than the purely passive 
defense, the led horses are usually held mobile unless the 
terrain favors holding them immobile close to the firing 
line. It is impracticable to lay down in figures the distance 
from the firing line that the led horses should be placed. 
The following must be considered in determining this 
distance ; the terrain ; the expected duration of the combat ; 
the amount and the activity of the enemy cavalry ; whether 
or not the enemy has machine guns and artillery. 



—80— 

Combat and field trains are held well to the rear and 
so disposed on a side road, the road situation permitting, 
as to enable them to move to the front or to the rear as the 
development of the situation may demand.. In the defen- 
sive a plentiful supply of ammunition is a requisite. Under 
favorable circumstances this, as well as entrenching tools 
may be brought up by the combat trains and the trains 
then returned to the rear. If the combat wagons are not 
to be moved up, both the extra ammunition and the en- 
trenching tools are carried up by the troops. 

The provision of a sufficient guard for the led horses 
is a matter of moment to the cavalry commander. At times 
the ground features may be such that but a small guard is 
necessary. In fact only large enough to straighten out 
entangled horses. Again the situation may be such that 
a large fraction of the defending force is employed on this 
duty. When the enemy's cavalry is numerous and aggres- 
sive, a relatively large guard is desirable. When only in- 
fantry is present, the guard may be greatly reduced. The 
closer the led horses are placed to the firing line the smaller 
the guard required. Machine rifles with the led horses 
are of especial value as their fire can be readily brought 
to bear in any direction. When a mounted reserve is 
present it usually furnishes sufficient protection, although 
even then it is well to post around the led horses enough 
patrols for both reconnaissance and security. When 
immobile the horses are helpless and greater precaution 
against attack is necessary than when they are mobile. 

Artillery is pushed well forward in concealed positions 
but affording an opportunity for direct laying with but 
little movement of the guns. 

As with infantry, machine guns constitute the frame- 
work of the defense. In the purely passive defense they 
are normally distributed in some depth, but in other 
situations the bulk if not all of the machine guns are 
placed well to the front to permit a maximum of fire being 
brought upon the enemy at the opening of the engagement. 
If the direction of the hostile main attack is not clear, the 
machine guns are often held in reserve until this is de- 
termined. Enfilade fire is sought. Care should be taken 
to see that they cover the flanks of the position, the avenues 



—81— 
of approach and the intervals between the groups of the 
firing line. 

The number of men to be placed in the firing line at 
the beginning of the engagement is regulated by the mission 
of the command. If the mission be carried out by fire 
power alone, and the direction of the enemy advance is 
known, the firing line is made strong from the beginning. 
If not, a premature and complete occupation of the position 
is to be avoided. The better plan under such circumstances 
is to occupy at the outset only a few points and to hold the 
bulk of the force in a position in readiness. This partial 
occupation of a defensive position makes it feasible to occupy 
a broad front while the enemy is at long ranges and may 
deceive him as to the strength of the defender. The small- 
er the force, the less is the application of the foregoing 
principle indicated. Its application is more pertinent 
if opposing cavalry than if opposing infantry. 

Units designated to protect a flank are echeloned to 
the rear of it. Reconnaissance by these units should be 
energetic and continuous. Whether they are employed 
mounted or dismounted is determined by the tactical sit- 
uation and by the, terrain. 

Supports are placed as close to the firing line as prac- 
ticable, and they reinforce the latter as the crisis approaches. 
When no cover is available or when a maximum fire is 
desired at the beginning of the engagement, supports may 
be placed from the beginning in the firing line. 

The Action 

The commander should control the opening of fire. 
This is due to the frequent desirability of opening a heavy 
fire all along the line from the very beginning of the engage- 
ment. However, this control becomes more difficult as the 
size of the command increases, and in larger commands, un- 
less satisfactory communication exists throughout the posi- 
tion, will be left to the discretion of commanders of subor- 
dinate units. Surprise effect is to be sought. Ordinarily, 
fire is opened at long ranges, but again the purely passive 
defense may furnish an exception to this principle. 

Machine guns and artillery join in to increase the fire 
effect. The latter may at times open fire before the small 



—82— 
arms to force an early deployment of the enemy, thereby 
creating additional delay. However, should the enemy 
have marked superiority in artillery, it is better to with- 
hold fire until a specially favorable target appears rather 
than to subject the position prematurely to hostile shelling. 
Vigorous bursts of fire are then used. 

The small arms also use bursts of fire. Having ac- 
customed the enemy to these, a withdrawal may be com- 
menced as one of the bursts ceases without exciting suspi- 
cion. It will often be of advantage to withhold the fire of 
machine guns and not to disclose their position until the 
enemy's main attack is under way. 

When offensive action is to be taken. by a part of the 
command, continuous reconnaissance should develop the 
time and the place to undertake it and should determine 
whether it is to occur mounted or dismounted. Should 
the commander desire to control this offensive, either as to 
time or place, definite orders should issue on the subject. 
If it is to be left to the discretion of the immediate com- 
mander, the latter is so informed prior to the initiation of 
the main action. 

In the "defense seeking a favorable decision" the 
portion of the command taking up the defensive should 
be so disposed as to invite attack. Efforts are made, while 
dismounting but few men, to give the impression of strength 
in the firing line. Artillery and machine guns aid in ac- 
complishing this. 

These troops are so disposed that the enemy may ex- 
pect a favorable decision provided he carries out the attack 
against them with sufficient force. 

The force to be used in the counter-stroke is detailed 
from the first and kept in reserve concealed from the view 
and the fire of the enemy, in so far as is practicable. 

When the situation clears, it is echeloned in rear of the 
flank from which the counter-stroke is to take place. 

In situations in which this location is neither desir- 
able nor possible, a base for attack should be selected which 
is out of range of the enemy's fire. Effort is made to have 
the attack come as a surprise. To accomplish this it is 
necessary to prevent the enemy from observing the con- 
duct of the maneuvering mass — the reserve. Energetic 



—83— 
and aggressive action is used against his patrols. Points 
overlooking the field of maneuver are occupied early in the 
action. 

Throughout the action in any class of defensive, pa- 
trolling must be thorough and constant. Any neglect of 
this may bring about disaster. 

Breaking Off an Engagement and Leaving a 

Position 

In breaking off an engagement and leaving a position 
it is most difficult to determine the exact time to disengage 
so that the led horses may be reached, the command success- 
fully withdrawn, and yet the maximum possible delay and 
loss imposed on the enemy. 

A premature withdrawal neither secures the requisite 
delay nor inflicts sufficient punishment. 

On the other hand a withdrawal too long delayed 
results in unnecessary casualties to the defender and may 
even eliminate him from further effective action. Should 
the led horses and the troopers be subject during the with- 
drawal to serious hostile fire, not only are the horses liable 
to stampede, but the troopers who successfully mount and 
ride away are apt to become demoralized and a subsequent 
assembly of them difficult. 

It is manifest that the difficulty of withdrawal increases 
with the progress of the action. 

In determining how close a dismounted enemy should 
be permitted to approach before withdrawing from a posi- 
tion, the following must be taken into consideration: 
Distance away the led horses are held; amount of cover 
from fire and from view in the rear of the position ; charac- 
ter of the routes of withdrawal ; character of the terrain over 
which the enemy must pass to reach the position or to reach 
a suitable position from which he may bring effective fire 
on the retreating forces. 

If the foregoing favor the defenders, the enemy may 
be allowed to approach to within 600 yards of the position 
before withdrawing ; if the retiring force be a troop or less, 
to within 300 yards, and under especially favorable condi- 
tions to even a less distance. 



—84— 
If conditions are not favorable, the withdrawal is made 
when the enemy is from 700 to 800 yards away. 

Machine guns of the enemy which have been pushed 
well to the front will add to the difficulty of the defender's 
withdrawal. 

The enemy should be kept in ignorance of the purpose 
to withdraw as long as possible, and having become accus- 
tomed to bursts of fire from the defenders, the withdrawal 
should commence immediately after one of these bursts. 

Scouts may be utilized to locate the routes of with- 
drawal for their commands and to serve as guides to the led 
horses and from their locations to the next position to be 
occupied or to a previously designated assembly point in 
rear. If the defensive combat is to be continued in retreat 
with a view to delaying the enemy, the commander must 
keep his troops well in hand and place them in a succes- 
sion of defensive positions which the enemy is compelled 
to attack or turn. 

When the defending force has not become seriously 
engaged, the defenders may simultaneously evacuate the 
position. To accomplish this successfully conditions must 
be favorable. However if they are sufficiently so, even a 
large force may be withdrawn in this way. Again, part 
by part withdrawal from a defensive position under cover 
of bursts of fire from the parts remaining is advisable. 
The troops at the greatest distance from their horses and 
those having the least cover in their rear, should be 
among the first to be relieved, while those with horses close 
at hand and having cover immediately available should 
hold to the last. 

In a withdrawal of the above character, consideration 
must be given to the order of withdrawal of the machine 
guns, machine rifles and riflemen. 

The length of time required to withdraw a machine 
gun from its position is greater than that required for a 
machine rifle or rifle. In consequence of the above, the 
safe withdrawal of the whole command requires that the 
elements needing the most time to disengage be the first 
removed. At times however it will be advisable to leave 
a small number of machine guns along the front to conceal 



—85— 
the fact that the withdrawal has commenced and to assist 
in holding the attackers at a distance. 

When the defending force has become seriously engaged, 
as before stated, successful withdrawal becomes difficult. 
If the action cannot be maintained until night and the with- 
drawal conducted under cover of darkness, some small 
detachments will have to be sacrificed to secure the retreat 
of the main body. The artillery keeps up its fire as long 
as possible and disregarding the hostile artillery turns its 
fire upon the advancing riflemen. Various especially strong 
supporting points in the position will be occupied, and the 
force withdrawn under cover of these. The defense of 
such supporting points, which are provided with machine 
guns, if available, must be conducted with the utmost ob- 
stinacy. 

Frequently the defense ends in the capture of the 
strong points, but the end gained is worth the sacrifice. 
Experience has shown that the attacker is apt to make 
desperate efforts to overcome these points and in so doing 
to forget to pursue the withdrawing masses of the defender's 
troops. 

The withdrawal is sometimes made under the protection 
of the reserve which may be used in rear, but preferably 
on a flank. Under protection of its fire the units engaged 
are withdrawn followed later by the reserve. 

Under favorable conditions, a mounted charge from a 
flank may be made to disengage the firing line, the latter 
withdrawing during the confusion thus created. 

Reserves 

Whether the reserve is to be held mounted or dis- 
mounted or both is determined by the character of the action 
contemplated and by the terrain. 

When the country is unsuitable for mounted operations 
or when a stubborn resistance is to be made and a counter- 
attack may become desirable the reserve is held dis- 
mounted. Its uses when so held are to protect the flanks 
against enveloping movements, to make a counter-attack or 
to cover a withdrawal of the firing line. It should be so 
posted as to be entirely free to act as a whole according to 
developments. Concealment and cover should be sought. 



—86— 

When the led horses and the artilllery need protection ; 
when it is desired to threaten the enemy's flanks or his led 
horses, to undertake turning movements or to reinforce the 
fighting line, the reserve is held mounted. Normally at 
least a part of the reserve is mounted. Its size varies 
greatly. In certain cases no reserve may be held. When 
there is no intention of accomplishing more than to cause 
an early deployment of the hostile force it may be desir- 
able to place every element on the firing line from the begin- 
ning. Again, when extension in width is very great it 
would weaken the actual front to hold out a reserve, as 
there would be no guarantee that it would reach the threat- 
ened point in time. In a passive defense the reserves can 
be reduced in proportion to the weakness of the enemy's 
cavalry and to the depth of the zone of security our patrols 
have secured. 

In the defense seeking a favorable decision, the bulk 
of the command is ordinarily held in reserve awaiting a 
clearing of the situation. 

Tanks 

If the enemy is known to be provided with tanks, 
attachment of artillery is essential to the conduct of a sucess- 
ful defense by cavalry. The use of single guns to cover 
approaches is then desirable. Our cavalry is at present 
provided with no other weapon that will stop a tank, al- 
though machine guns, by opening heavy fire on approach- 
ing tanks, especially against the aperture through which 
the operator directs the movement of the tank, can at 
times prevent its maneuvering effectively. If, in any cam- 
paign, frequent encounters with hostile tanks is anticipated, 
it may become necessary to equip each squadron with one- 
pounder guns and to have each trooper carry one or two 
bombs for the purpose of attacking the tanks. 

In the selection of a position, the fact that marshes, 
watercourses, thick woods and very steep slopes constitute 
obstacles to the advance of tanks should be considered. A 
stream with a firm bottom is no obstacle unless the water 
is at least four feet deep. A deep swamp, or a stream with 
a soft bottom, is an effective obstacle. Artificial obstruc- 
tions may be utilized when time permits. 



—87— 
Artillery 

While horse artillery is the type of artillery ordinarily 
employed with cavalry, light artillery may be, and fre- 
quently is, used to accompany it. While not as mobile as 
horse artillery, it is sufficiently so in many situations, and 
particularly so in defensive operations. With divisional 
cavalry, light artillery will be the only type available. 

Artillery greatly increases the; ^defensive power 1 of 
cavalry. When both artillery and machine guns are present, 
the two, in fact, constitute the major portion of its defen- 
sive power. 

By forcing early deployment, artillery adds materially 
to the cavalry's ability to delay an approaching enemy; 
and as it can reach the enemy at long ranges, it is especially 
valuable in securing surprise. To secure this and an early 
deployment of the hostile force it is placed as far to the 
front as security permits. 

Its position is concealed when practicable but, especially 
if opposed to cavalry, should be such as to permit direct lay- 
ing. 

The artillery commander remains with the cavalry com- 
mander until assigned a definite mission. Thereafter the 
artillery commander maintains communication with the cav- 
alry commander, who in turn, keeps the former informed as 
to his plans and intentions. 

In a position from which withdrawal is contemplated, 
care in the selection of the command post with reference to 
the location of the artillery positions is necessary, so that the 
efforts of the cavalry and its supporting artillery may be 
co-ordinated. 

The cavalry commander will in most cases control the 
opening of fire so that he may be the one to decide' as to 
whether forcing an early deployment and inflicting early 
losses on the enemy is to be preferred to the liability of 
prematurely disclosing the defensive position. Once fire 
is. opened, the artillery commander acts on his own initi- 
ative and must be ready to seize all opportunities for effec- 
tive action against the enemy in accordance with the general 
instructions of the cavalry commander. On principle, fire 
should be directed against such parts of the enemy's force 
as have immediate influence on the outcome of the engage- 



—88— 
ment. Particularly favorable opportunities for firing on 
the enemy's artillery need not be neglected, however, in 
consequence of the foregoing. 

Certain situations may require a separation of the bat- 
tery into platoons or single pieces. It will be necessary in 
anti-tank defenses and at times in the close defense of iso- 
lated positions. In general, however, the breaking up of 
the battery should be avoided as it interferes not only with 
a proper control and concentration of fire but also adds to 
the difficulty of withdrawal. 

In defensive combat, artillery seldom requires a special 
support. In ordinary cases the reserve or the nearest 
available troops assume this duty. 

If the defense fails, artillery and machine guns will 
from successive positions cover the retreat by directing 
their fire against the pursuers without regard to the enemy's 
artillery fire. 

In extreme cases the situation may call for the sacri- 
fice of the guns to insure the withdrawal of the remainder 
of the command. 

Machine Guns 

The increase in both numbers and efficiency of the 
machine guns now issued to the cavalry has greatly strength- 
ened its defensive power, while the machine rifle still fur- 
ther adds to it. 

A cavalry force equipped with these two weapons and 
in a well selected defensive position across the line of march 
of a superior force of all arms, can greatly delay its advance 
unless this force is in turn possessed of an enterprising 
cavalry of sufficient strength to permit it to outflank the 
position. Numerous machine guns in well concealed posi- 
tions ' are not readily silenced by hostile artillery. A 
more or less prepared attack is necessary if the enemy is to 
continue his advance. The prepared attack requires time. 
In many situations, by gaining this, the cavalry completely 
fulfills its mission. Furthermore, if additional delay is 
demanded, its mobility permits it to withdraw to another 
position farther in the rear to repeat the operation. Even 
though the enemy be possessed of superior cavalry the 
terrain is often such that the hostile cavalry is forced to 
make so wide a detour that the desired delay is accomplished 
before the outflanking movement can be completed. 



—89— 

The location of machine guns in defense has been 
covered under "occupation of the position" but in addition 
to what is there stated, mutual support and the covering 
of the positions of the machine guns by machine and rifle 
fire is essential. This is necessary not only in case of 
hostile dismounted attack but for protection against the 
recognized method of mounted attack ; that is, "by foragers 
charging from various directions at the same time." Never- 
theless the protection of the machine guns must not lead 
to neglecting to fire on the main bodies of the enemy. 

The Field Service Regulations under "Cavalry in De- 
fensive Combat" cite many instances of the use of cavalry. 
In considering these it is evident that the defensive combat 
therein referred to is that of the command of which the 
cavalry forms a part rather than that of the cavalry itself. 

Cavalry, employed as in the instances cited, acts gener- 
ally on the offensive. This discussion is designed to cover 
only the defensive action of the cavalry itself. 



CHAPTER VI 
Marches 



Relationship of Marching to Care of Animals and 

to Tactics 

The subject of cavalry marches is closely related both 
to care of animals and to tactics. 

A difficult problem that continually confronts a cavalry 
officer is that of bringing his command on the field of actual 
combat with one of its principal weapons, the horse, in 
serviceable condition, not only for the charge, but for the 
rapid movements required by the varied role of cavalry on 
the battlefield under modern conditions. Experience shows 
that when cavalry has been unable to respond to the demands 
of the action or to take advantage of opportunities presented, 
failure has been due to the exhaustion or to the injuries of 
the horses rather than to the fatigue of the men. Accord- 
ingly, attention is concentrated on minimizing the wear and 
tear of horseflesh. Incidentally, but none the less surely, 
the rider's condition is benefited by the good condition of his 
mount. 

In many cases the time element is of primary impor- 
tance. In other cases, the necessity for having the horses 
fit for service at the end of the march is the controlling con- 
sideration. Ordinarily, men and animals must arrive at 
their destination fit for either mounted combat or further 
rapid or extended marching. Proper training, use, and 
care of animals is therefore important as a means of secur- 
ing tactical results. Cavalry officers must know the powers 
and limitations of their mounts in order that they may make 
logical tactical decisions and plan movements and actions. 

Rates of march have an important bearing in all tac- 
tical situations preceding and following actual combat. 
A knowledge of possible rates and their effect on the animals 
is therefore of great importance to cavalry officers. Rate 

90 



—91— 

tables that have been tried and found accurate are neces- 
sary in order to provide certainty in the calculations on 
which tactical plans and decisions are based. By the use 
of such rate tables, an idea of the terrain such as can be 
gained from a good military map, and the knowledge that 
every cavalry officer should have of the condition of his 
mounts, a leader will be enabled to base his deductions on 
facts rather than guesses, to state with certainty that he 
can march a given distance in a given time and to predict 
with confidence the condition of his animals on arrival at 
the destination. 

Training 

Horse training is of tactical importance because the 
object of all military instruction is to train troops to em- 
ploy their maximum powers and capabilities in campaign. 
To reach correct tactical decisions, an officer must know 
how far and how fast his command can march and also 
what its fighting power will be at the end of the march. 
This knowledge is gained from the preliminary training 
previously given. Horse training includes gaiting at the 
regulation 4-mile walk, 8-mile trot and 12-mile gallop. 

It is inevitable that the proportion of cavalry recruits 
drawn from classes of horsemen who are accustomed to 
thinking of the needs of the horse will be almost negli- 
gible. Consequently, this instinct of the natural horseman 
must be replaced by an equivalent habit resulting from 
special and persistent training. 

Supervision in actual service can at best correct only 
a few neglects or errors. The individual troopers must 
have been first trained into horse savers. The supervision 
of the officers and noncommissioned officers will then suf- 
fice to keep them up to their work under stress of hard- 
ship, fatigue, and excitement. 

Although, in discussing marches, it is usually assumed 
that the animals are in condition, yet marches are often 
undertaken with horses that for various reasons are not in 
proper condition. Distances covered and time under saddle 
must then be very short until "condition" has been obtained. 
If forced by imperative military necessity to disregard this 
precaution, we must frankly face a loss of 50 per cent al- 
most immediately, due to sore backs and exhaustion. 



—92— 

Preparation 

Before starting, special instructions should anticipate 
everything that can be foreseen in the adjustment of sad- 
dlery and equipment and in the shoeing. 

In the winter, the ice calks must be looked into and it 
must be certain that the men know how to apply and remove 
them quickly. 

If there are extra horses, they should carry a few 
spare saddle blankets to replace those which will be de- 
stroyed by cutting to relieve saddle galls. 

Of all tactical orders, the march order is the sim- 
plest. In small commands this is usually issued orally after 
the command has been formed. The actual march order 
should be preceded by a warning order, which should state 
as much of the following as may be known: — the hour of 
starting, the distance to be marched, the equipment, for- 
age, and rations to be carried, and what transportation 
is to accompany the command. When possible, this warn- 
ing order should be issued the evening before so that supply, 
stable and mess sergeants can make due preparation. It 
is generally wrong for a march order to prescribe gaits. 
If necessary, the time of arrival at destination or at inter- 
mediate points may be prescribed, but even this may inter- 
fere with the initiative of subordinates unless the tactical 
situation demands that time of arrival be fixed in order to 
co-ordinate the work. 

The Start 

Except for imperative military reasons, the start should 
not be made until an hour after daylight. In mixed com- 
mands the mobility of cavalry will allow it to move out in 
the morning still more deliberately without danger of pro- 
longing its march too late in the day. 

Night marches are slow and fatiguing and should not 
be undertaken unless required by the situation. However, 
under conditions of modern warfare, night marches in 
the theater of operations will be the rule rather than the 
exception. Under favorable conditions of road and moon- 
light, night marches present no great difficulties, but such 
desirable conditions are frequently lacking. 



—93— 

Formation 

On the roads it will usually be impracticable to march 
with wider front than column of fours, and column of twos 
will often be necessary. When the situation permits length- 
ening the column, the habitual formation, in actual prac- 
tice, is column of twos because of the greater comfort. In 
the vicinity of the enemy, every effort must be made to re- 
duce the length of the column by closing up as much as is 
compatible with comfort and economy of effort and, with 
a large command, by utilizing parallel roads. If the width 
of roads will permit or the terrain off the roads is suitable, 
the march might be made in double column. 

In commands larger than a regiment, the use of two 
or more roads is preferable to marching a long column on 
one road, but the tactical situation must determine this. 

In order to avoid checks and irregularities of gait and 
to allow the dust to settle or blow away, distances must be 
left between platoons; these distances like those between 
larger units disappear when checks occur and are at times 
exceeded, but there is a constant tendency to recover them. 
Each element marches so as best to take advantage of the 
ground. Units do not change gait simultaneously but each 
takes up the trot or walk at the point where the preceding 
unit changed gait. 

Cavalry should be able to march across country and 
should not be tied down to roads. However, progress on 
roads is more rapid than across country and is less 
fatiguing. 

In campaign the roads will often be reserved for the 
infantry, artillery and combat trains, and the cavalry will 
find its way across country. It can then sometimes march 
in the maneuvering column with platoon front, a formation 
which permits each horse to see clearly the ground before 
hiin and gives relief from dust. This formation will prob- 
ably not be practicable in many cases. The regiment may 
also use the double column. 

Good footing for the horses must be sought whether 
on or off the roads. This is of more importance than the 
accurate preservation of regular formations. Good soft 
footing will often be found at the sides of the roads and 
the column can be spread out, traveling along both sides. 



—94— 
In going across country in platoon front the troopers take 
intervals to find good footing, and after a few platoons have 
passed, the horses of the succeeding platoons will be follow- 
ing smooth and well defined trails. By sending a party 
ahead to cut and roll up barbed wire, open the fences, and 
prepare crossings, the column can advance steadily. When 
a short defile appears in front, the leading unit, if the 
ground permits, increases the gait until it has passed well 
beyond it, so as to avoid checking the column. 

Length and Rate of Marches 

The length and rate of marches are dependent upon 
the mission of the command. Ordinary marches for cav- 
alry are at about 20 to 25 miles a day with a marching 
rate of 5 miles per hour, including halts. This rate can 
be maintained indefinitely by a seasoned command under 
normal conditions as to forage, water and roads. 

Emergency Marches may be much longer and at much 
faster gaits. The mission determines both. Cavalry can 
march 50 miles a day for a few days without loss of effi- 
ciency. A more rapid rate may be justified by the mission, 
but the combat efficiency of the command at the end of the 
march will probably suffer. 

The longer the column, the less the speed. In peace 
time, commands can be broken into fractions and the 
entire command makes the time of the smaller units; but 
in time of war, tactical considerations usually forbid this 
division of a command into fractions. Larger commands 
than a troop cannot expect to make long, rapid emergency 
marches and be capable of sustained mounted combat with- 
out having had a period of rest. However, in Palestine, 
the 5th British Cavalry Division made a forced march of 
about 65 miles in 24 hours. At the end of the march, it 
galloped into Nazareth, fought a hot street fight, and cap- 
tured the Turkish Army Group Headquarters and 2,000 
prisoners. 

The work to be demanded of the cavalry at the end of 
the forced march must be kept in view; this is presumably 
a mounted role, and the horses must be brought on the 
field in a condition to do their part. If it is *not the inten- 
tion to call for mounted action at the end of the forced 



—95— 
march, this fact must be clearly stated in the orders to the 
cavalry. Then the cavalry commander will be justified 
in sacrificing some of his horses. 

The usual (marching gaits are the walk and trot 
combined with leading. Officers unfamiliar with cavalry 
work are prone to gallop too much. While the gallop is 
feasible at times and under certain circumstances, it soon 
wears out the animals on a march. 

Rate Tables. — The following rate tables have been 
prepared and tested at the Cavalry School at Fort Riley. 
From them, one who knows the condition of his mounts 
and the nature of the roads over which the march is made, 
can prepare a march schedule with a degree of accuracy 
thought impossible by those who have not given the sub- 
ject careful consideration. 

3 miles per hour = 88 yards per minute = ^o miles per 
minute. 

4 miles per hour = 117J yards per minute = Ms miles per 
minute. 

8 miles per hour = 234 § yards per minute = %5 miles per 
minute. 

10 miles per hour =: 293 J yards per minute == J miles per 
minute. 

By multiplying the distance per minute by the number 
of minutes in a period we get the distance we shall cover 
in that period. Then by adding these distances we get the 
total distance for all the periods in the hour and the num- 
ber of miles per hour that our schedule will give us. 

The 10-mile trot is not an authorized gait. Its use 
should be limited to emergencies for individual horsemen, 
such as specially mounted messengers. 

Rate Table No. 1 — 5 Miles Per Hour 

Ordinary conditions as to Road and Weather. 
Alternate Trotting and Leading. 
Total trotting — 30 minutes at 8 miles per hour = 4 miles. 
Total leading — 20 minutes at 3 miles per hour = 1 mile. 
Resting — 10 minutes 



60 minutes 5 miles. 

The 10 minutes for rest must include time lost mount- 
ing and dismounting. 

Periods are determined by the ground and should ap- 
proximate 10 minutes in length, but may be shortened to 
5 or increased not to exceed 12 or 15 minutes. 



—96— 
For a command smaller than a platoon, such as a patrol, 
periods may be shortened still more, but under ordinary 
conditions trot periods should never exceed the maximum 
of 12 to 15 minutes. 

Rate Table No. 2 — 5J Miles Per Hour 

Ordinary conditions of Road and Weather. 
Alternate Trotting and Walking. 
Total Trotting — 30 minutes at 8 miles per hour = 4 miles. 
Total Walking — 20 minutes at 4 miles per hour = 1J miles. 
Resting — 10 minutes 



60 minutes 5 J miles. 

The full 10 minutes' rest should be taken as there is no 
leading. 

Periods of trotting or walking are determined as in 
Table No. 1. 

Rate Table No. 3 — 5J- Miles Per Hour 

Ordinary conditions of Road and Weather. 
Trotting, Walking, and Leading. 
Total Trotting — 30 minutes at 8 miles per hour = 4 miles. 
Total Walking — 10 minutes at 4 miles per hour = § miles. 
Total Leading— 10 minutes at 3 miles per hour = J miles. 
Resting; — 10 minutes 



60 minutes 5£ miles. 

Rest and gait periods determined as in Table No. 1. 

Rate Table No. 4 — 4-J Miles Per Hour 

Ordinary conditions of Road and Weather. 
Total Trotting — 20 minutes at 8 miles per hour = 2§ miles. 
Total Walking — 20 minutes at 4 miles per hour = IS miles. 
Total Leading — 10 minutes at 3 miles per hour = \ miles. 
Resting — 10 minutes 



30 minutes 4i miles. 

Rest and gait periods determined as in Table No. 1. 

Rate Table No. 5 — 6 Miles Per Hour 

Good Roads — Rapid Marching, Cool Weather. 
Total Trotting — 35 minutes at 8 miles per hour = 4§ miles. 
Total Walking — 20 minutes at 4 miles per hour = 1^ miles. 
Resting — 5 minutes 



60 minutes 6 miles. 

Periods at the different gaits are determined as in 
Table No. 1. 



—97— 

Rate Table No. 6 — 3 Miles Per Hour 

Roads Hilly or Poor — Animals Tired or Poorly Fed — 
Trotting Difficult or Impossible. 
Total Walking — 30 minutes at 4 miles per hour = 2 miles 
Total Leading — 20 minutes at 3 miles per hour = 1 mile. 
Resting — 10 minutes 



60 minutes 3 miles. 

These tables are capable of infinite variation, accord- 
ing to conditions of road and weather and the requirements 
of the tactical situation. The size of the command will 
also affect the rate of march for obvious reasons. Judg- 
ment must be used throughout in applying the tables. 
Periods of trotting, walking or leading should not be long, 
for fatigue quickly results. Neither should they be too short. 
Short periods are possible in small commands, such as a 
platoon or less. Patrols, of necessity, must regulate their 
march by tactical requirements and cannot march by any 
fixed schedule. For large commands, too frequent changes 
of gait are exhausting to both men and animals. 

Security on the march is provided by covering detach- 
ments which are themselves engaged in marching. The 
success of the work of these detachments requires that each 
subordinate commander shall have a knowledge of the care 
and use of animals, and also that he be trained in conduct- 
ing a march and in using rate tables. These subordinates 
must, of course, know the route and rate of march of the 
command from which they are detached, and, if possible, 
its destination. Their missions may require them to gain 
distance to the front or flank and then march at practically 
the same rate as the main command. On the other hand, 
their missions may require long marches, the rate of which 
must be so regulated that they will reach the destination of 
the main body simultaneously with it. They should use 
rate tables, therefore, in estimating their own situations. 
The rate of march of security patrols, of course, cannot be 
regulated by schedule. The situation and their mission 
determine their rates of march. 

Halts 

The first halt should be made after a couple of miles 
have been covered and within three-quarters of an hour 
after starting. This halt should, if possible, be preceded by 



—98— 
a short trot in order to betray to the troopers any faulty 
adjustment of equipment. This halt gives an opportunity 
for the horses to stale, and for the troopers to tighten girths 
and adjust saddlery, equipment, and dress. 

Other halts of 5 to 10 minutes should be made at hourly 
intervals. If the march is to be prolonged into the afternoon, 
a longer halt should be made at noon when the girths are 
loosened, horses fed, and the men eat their lunch. 

On an unusually long march this long halt may be ex- 
tended to admit of unsaddling, but this must not be done 
without the precaution of previous loosening of girths and 
cooling of backs, supplemented by hand rubbing. Some 
saddles may even then have to be immediately replaced to 
keep down swelling and prevent injury. In all commands 
there should be a recognized habitual hour for halting — for 
instance, 10 minutes before the hour. 

March Discipline and Expedients for Saving 
Horseflesh 

Leading. — To avoid tremendous waste of horseflesh, 
much of the marching of cavalry in campaign must be by 
leading. This meets with strong prejudice on the part of 
the average cavalry officer and soldier. However, as the 
object is to win battles and campaigns regardless of preju- 
dice and personal inconvenience, such an opposition must 
be laid aside if results justify. Actual tests both in peace 
and war show that both animals and men arrive at the end 
of the march in better condition if frequent leading is done 
than if the men remain continuously mounted while march- 
ing. Training is necessary to successful leading, or columns 
will be lengthened and distances greatly extended. Simi- 
larly, the fitting of the man's shoes and the care of the 
feet must have greater consideration by cavalry officers 
than at present or the command will arrive on the field too 
footsore to engage in dismounted combat. 

Objection to leading is sometimes based on the claim 
that frequent mounting and dismounting disarranges the 
saddle and pack and tends to produce sore backs. Too 
frequent mounting and dismounting does have this effect, 
but a reasonable amount will have no deleterious effect, 
provided that manes have not been clipped. Clipping of 



—99— 
manes should never be permitted on animals that are to be 
used on campaign. 

Gait Setters. — Every command should have a non- 
commissioned officer with a well-gaited horse to set the 
gaits. The organization commander should delegate this 
duty. He himself, should be free to take whatever gait is 
advisable and to give his mind to tactical considerations, 
knowing that his command is progressing at the rate he 
has ordered. This gait setter should ride at the head of 
the command. Commands for change of gait are given 
by the officer in command, who determines the gait accord- 
ing to the nature of the road or the tactical requirements 
of the situation. 

March discipline, all-important in practice marches in 
time of peace, has added importance in time of war. Par. 
96, Field Service Regulations, states, "A successful march, 
whether in peace or war, is one that places the troops at 
their destination at the proper moment and in the best pos- 
sible condition." This is impossible of accomplishment 
unless march discipline of the highest order is enforced. 

Troopers must ride at the gaits ordered, keep proper 
distances, and maintain correct position in the saddle. 

Troops must be informed of the length of all halts so 
that full advantage can be taken of the same. Saddles 
must be readjusted and the horses' feet examined. Saddles 
can best be adjusted if the men work in pairs, and this 
practice must be 'habitual. Noncommissioned officers 
must inspect animals and saddles at every halt. These 
things must be attended to immediately after halting. The 
lighting of cigarettes and the doing of other things for the 
trooper's comfort come after, not before, the care of sad- 
dles and animals. Otherwise the order to mount will' find 
half the command with loosened cinchas. A minute's warn- 
ing should precede the call to attention or the order to 
mount. 

The command should be mounted only when the order 
to march is to follow immediately. No member of the 
command should be permitted to sit his horse at the halt. 

All commands should be kept to the right of the road, 
leaving the left free. This is a matter of training. The 
discipline of the command can be judged largely by its prac- 
tice in this regard. 



—100— 

Straggling should never be permitted. No one should 
be allowed to fall out without permission of proper author- 
ity, and this permission should be sparingly given. If a 
soldier has to fall out from necessity, another, preferably 
a N. C. 0., should be designated to accompany him. 

In case of checks due to obstacles, troopers and units 
should be trained to overlap when there is room and thus 
avoid the shock throughout the column. 

Grazing should be permitted at the halts, especially 
on long marches and when forage is scarce. 

Advantage should be taken of every opportunity to 
water horses during the march. 



CHAPTER VII 

Pursui 



Military history is full of examples of the failure of 
commanders to take advantage of their opportunities to 
destroy a beaten enemy. It is hardly possible to lay too 
great stress on the importance of taking up a prompt and 
vigorous pursuit as soon as the battle has been won. The 
importance of pursuit is well stated in paragraph 179, Field 
Service Regulations, which is as follows: 

"Importance. — Only by means of an energetic pursuit of 
the beaten enemy can the full fruits of victory and decisive results 
therefrom be obtained. It is not the mere defeat of the enemy's 
army, but its destruction, that ends the campaign. The task of 
the victorious army is less than half performed when it remains 
satisfied with the mere possession of the battlefield. Pursuit 
must immediately follow victory, and every effort be made to 
continue contact with the enemy, day and night, up to the abso- 
lute limit of physical endurance of the troops." 

Because of its ability to combine mobility with fire 
power, cavalry is peculiarly suited to this important work, 
which is one of its special duties. By making use of its 
mobility, cavalry can throw itself against that part of a 
defeated hostile force that is most helpless, or it can reach 
a position from which it is able to do the most damage to the 
enemy's retreating columns. Having used its mobility to 
reach a favorable position, it possesses powerful means of 
inflicting loss and of turning the retreat into a rout. It 
employs that form of action that is best suited to the local 
situation in order to inflict the maximum loss. When the 
local situation favors a mounted attack, it uses that 
method. Where the situation favors the use of dis- 
mounted fire action, the kind of fire action that it needs is 
that kind which brings into play the maximum number of 
rifles from the start, and that is the kind of fire action 
for which the cavalry is trained. Thus, it is not only be- 
cause it is able to reach the most vulnerable parts of the 
enemy's retreating force but also because it possesses the 

101 



—102— 

most effective means of inflicting loss after it has arrived 
there, that the cavalry is the most effective arm for the 
pursuit. 

While we must recognize the limitations of cavalry in 
the battle itself, it is perhaps not overstating the case to 
say that its value in the pursuit alone would justify its exis- 
tence. Certainly, the Germans had reason to regret in 
the spring of 1918 that they had dismounted their cavalry 
divisions on the Western Front. The best opportunity 
they ever had to end the war victoriously was lost, mainly 
because they did not have a strong mounted force avail- 
able to send in pursuit of the defeated Fifth British Army. 

In his final despatch, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig 
says, "On the morning of the armistice, two British cavalry 
divisions were on the march east of the Scheldt, and before 
the order to stop reached them they had already gained a 
line ten miles in advance of our infantry outposts. There 
is no doubt that, had the advance of the cavalry been per- 
mitted to continue, the enemy's disorganized retreat would 
have been turned into a rout." 

There are certain general tactical principles which 
govern the conduct of pursuit by cavalry. These general 
principles are stated briefly in Field Service Regulations, 
and in Cavalry Service Regulations, 1914. They have been 
formulated as the result of long experience and are un- 
questionably sound. However, it is necessary to keep con- 
stantly in mind that these principles are only general prin- 
ciples and not invariable rules. Like any other tactical 
principles they must be applied with common sense and 
with due consideration of all the circumstances of each 
particular case. If accepted literally and without analysis 
or reflection, some of them are apt to be misunderstood. 
The general idea underlying, all these principles is that 
the pursuit must be taken up immediately after the infantry 
battle and pushed with the utmost vigor and perseverance 
until the enemy is destroyed or every man and every horse 
is exhausted in the attempt. In getting this idea, it is 
necessary to avoid getting the impression that pursuit 
means the immediate launching of all the mounted troops 
available in a more or less helter-skelter fashion against 
the various portions of the retreating hostile force. Like 



—103— 
all other operations, a pursuit to be successful must be as 
carefully planned as time and circumstances will permit. 
The more carefully the pursuit is planned, the more success- 
ful it will be. If the direction and general plan of retreat 
of the hostile force can be foreseen, it will sometimes be 
possible to formulate and issue in advance to the com- 
manders of the principal cavalry units a plan of pursuit 
to be put into effect when the retreat actually begins. 

It is the purpose of this chapter to take up some of 
the principles laid down for the conduct of cavalry in pur- 
suit and to go somewhat into detail in discussing the methods 
to be followed in carrying them out. 

After a successful battle, all bodies of cavalry, large and 
small— including horse artillery attached and corps and 
division cavalry — should be used in the pursuit. After 
a victory, the mass of the army can dispense with the ser- 
vices of the cavalry temporarily. 

The corps and divisional cavalry that has been recon- 
noitering out in front will be withdrawn to the rear or 
flanks at the beginning of a battle when the two opposing 
infantry forces come into contact. The cavalry belonging 
to interior corps of a long battle line will usually be with- 
drawn directly to the rear through the infantry. That 
belonging to flank corps will usually be needed for the close 
in protection of the flanks. In both cases it should be given 
every opportunity consistent with the situation to rest after 
its arduous duties of reconnaissance immediately preced- 
ing the battle. As soon as the battle appears to be draw- 
ing to an end, the cavalry must be pushed well toward the 
front so as to be immediately available to take up the pur- 
suit or to cover the retreat. 

The army cavalry will normally operate well out 
on one or both flanks during the battle. No matter what 
the outcome of the battle may be, the most advantageous 
position for the bulk of the cavalry at the end of the battle 
is well forward on a flank. When a pursuit is in prospect 
it must gain the mastery over the hostile cavalry if it has 
not already done so, and secure a position well forward. 
In certain cases the plans of the army commander may 
require that the cavalry remain inactive in order that the 
secrecy of an envelopment on that flank may be preserved. 



—104— 
In such cases the cavalry must push forward as soon as 
secrecy is no longer necessary. 

Mastery over the enemy's cavalry is necessary to a 
successful pursuit. If it has not been gained before or 
during the battle, pursuit will probably be so hampered 
or delayed that the enemy will be able to make his retreat 
in good order. Of course, if the enemy has such an inferior 
force of cavalry that it has had to seek the protection of its 
infantry from the start, it may be considered that the mas- 
tery has already been gained. 

Against the desire to get well forward before the pur- 
suit begins, the cavalry commander must balance the neces- 
sity of having his horses in the best possible condition to 
take up a vigorous pursuit. The effectiveness of the pur- 
suit will depend to a large extent upon the condition of the 
horses, and everything possible must be done to keep them 
fit. Great attention should be paid to giving them all the 
rest that circumstances will permit and every effort should 
be made to keep them on full rations of forage without 
using up the small reserve supply that is carried on the 
saddles. If it comes to decision between gaining a distinct 
tactical advantage or saving the horses, tactical considera- 
tions must govern. The best way to avoid such a difficulty 
is to eliminate the hostile cavalry as early in the campaign 
as possible. 

The cavalry takes up the pursuit of a beaten or re- 
treating enemy at once. 

Whether the plan of the commander of the whole force 
has been communicated in the form of orders or not, it 
will usually comprise the following if a strong enough 
force of cavalry is available: 

(1) Direct pursuit on the enemy's heels, including local 
envelopments undertaken on the initiative of subordinate com- 
manders. 

(2) An attack against the flank and immediate rear of the 
enemy's line. This attack in combination with the direct pur- 
suit may be considered as an envelopment of the enemy's line 
as a whole. 

(3) Parallel pursuit to operate against the flank of those 
portions of the hostile forces which . are already in full retreat, 
or to seize a position ahead of the retreating enemy and cut him 
off. 

Strategical and Tactical Pursuit. — The first two 
are often referred to as the tactical pursuit because they 



—105— 
are carried on without losing contact with the enemy and 
have the tactical object of defeating his rear guards and 
keeping them on the move. The third, parallel pursuit, is 
referred to as the strategic pursuit because it is taken up off 
the field of battle and has the strategic object of striking 
the enemy's main retreating columns and of destroying 
his main army or at least of forcing it to fight another 
battle. It forces the enemy to change his strategic plans. 

The direct pursuit is initiated by the troops engaged 
in the battle. Cavalry cannot usually undertake a direct 
pursuit from the battle front until the pursuit by fire has 
ceased. Beyond the reach of infantry fire of pursuit the 
cavalry must seek to prevent the enemy from reforming 
his organizations and starting them on the roads in columns 
of route. 

Only a small proportion of the cavalry should be used 
in direct pursuit. 

Such cavalry as takes part in the direct pursuit can 
generally be used to best advantage if it operates under the 
orders of corps or division commanders. When the hos- 
tile infantry withdraws from the battle, it will cover itself 
by rear guards. Although these rear guards may have a 
large proportion of mounted troops, they may be expected 
to put up a stubborn though temporary defense. The 
work of overcoming their resistance by direct attack is in- 
fantry work so long as the infantry is able to keep it up. 
The commanders of the pursuing infantry will have much 
use for the cavalry attached to their commands. With 
only dismounted troops at their disposal they will be con- 
stantly losing touch with the hostile rear guards. This 
will be especially true if the latter are mounted, but even 
if they are composed of dismounted troops some cavalry 
will be needed to keep contact with them. It is of the 
greatest importance that contact shall never be lost. The 
cavalry must not only keep the pursuing infantry informed 
of the location of the hostile rear guards but must also 
take part in the fight. It will get its greatest tactical re- 
sults by using its mobility to the limit to harass the hostile 
rear guards by attacking them in flank or rear while they 
are changing position, and by threatening their rear when 
they are in position. There will also be many oppor- 



—106— 
tunities for the cavalry to attack rear guard positions in 
flank either with or without the assistance of the direct 
attack by the pursuing infantry. 

The form of action (i.e., mounted or dismounted) will 
depend upon the local situation in each case. A large fac- 
tor in deciding this question will be the degree of demoraliza- 
tion of the enemy. Each cavalry leader must apply to the 
situation which confronts him the principles that govern 
cavalry combat in general. In applying them, however, 
it should be remembered that during the pursuit the cavalry 
will be called upon to attack again and again and that it 
is much easier to break off a fire fight than it is to reassemble 
after a mounted charge. By dismounting to fire into the 
retreating enemy from positions on the flanks, the cavalry 
also gives its horses much needed breathing spells. While 
these considerations are important they must not be per- 
mitted to diminish the boldness and aggressiveness with 
which the cavalry pursues. A leader must constantly weigh 
the advantages of striking hard with his whole force against 
the advantages of harassing the enemy by fire with a view 
to launching an attack later with bigger results. When 
in doubt, the boldest course is the best. 

It will often happen at the end of a battle that the vic- 
torious infantry is too exhausted or demoralized to take 
up the pursuit, or that the retreating enemy has outdis- 
tanced it. Then, full responsibility for the direct pursuit 
devolves upon the cavalry. Even then, the proportion of 
cavalry assigned to the direct pursuit should be small, be- 
cause it is the operations against the flank and rear of the 
hostile army that bring decisive results. Normally, it is 
the corps cavalry that is assigned to the direct pursuit. 
It is usually sent out at first by orders from the corps com- 
manders, but it will soon have to act upon its own initiative, 
especially if the pursuing infantry falls behind. At times a 
portion of the army cavalry will be assigned to the 
direct pursuit, or all of the corps cavalry may be united under 
one cavalry commander for this duty. In any event the com- 
mander of the army cavalry that is operating on 
the flank cannot expect to retain control over that portion 
which is assigned to the direct pursuit.. He may give it 
its original orders, or, in the case of corps cavalry, may 



—107— 
arrange to co-operate with it, but any plan that restricts 
the initiative of the commander on the spot is sure to re- 
duce the effectiveness of the pursuit. 

When acting without infantry support, cavalry in di- 
rect pursuit will seldom have sufficient strength to attack 
positions taken up by the hostile rear guards except in 
flank or rear. It will generally be more a question of harass- 
ing them and keeping them on the move than of destroying 
them. 

Of the cavalry pursuing on the flank of a retreating 
army, a portion should be assigned the tactical mission of 
co-operating with the infantry in enveloping movements 
and of hanging on to the enemy's flanks. The bulk of the 
army cavalry should be assigned to the parallel pursuit 
with the strategic mission of striking the enemy's col- 
umns that are already in full retreat, or of cutting them off. 

The cavalry that is assigned the tactical mission of 
hanging on to the enemy's flanks may be a part of the army 
cavalry, it may be corps cavalry concentrated on one flank 
of the army or it may be a composite force made up from 
both sources. It may operate under the orders of the com- 
mander of the army cavalry, but it should co-operate 
with the corps cavalry. It will frequently be advisable to 
detach part of the army cavalry and place it under 
the orders of the commander of a flank corps. It is the 
duty of this force to assist in the final breaking of the 
enemy's resistance on the battlefield by attacking his line 
in flank and rear. After the retreat has started it must 
never lose contact. It operates on the same general princi- 
ples as the smaller groups assigned to the direct pursuit, 
except that its work is entirely on the flank. It should have 
artillery attached and should use both its artillery and 
its machine guns to the limit to inflict losses on the enemy 
and turn his retreat into a rout. It will often encounter 
the bulk of the cavalry force that is covering the enemy's 
flank and for that reason should be given considerable 
strength. If the hostile cavalry is too strong to be over- 
come and dispersed or driven back on its infantry, this 
hostile cavalry must be kept occupied with the idea of neu- 
tralizing it and keeping it from interfering with the parallel 
pursuit. At the same time, detachments must be sent to 



—108— 
get contact with the hostile infantry and harass it in 
every way possible. There must be no hesitation in sub- 
dividing the force if necessary to get results, even when 
opposed by a superior body of hostile cavalry. In the pur- 
suit, cavalry is playing for high stakes and these cannot be 
won without taking corresponding risks. 

The fighting tactics to be used in the close pursuit on 
the flank are in general the same as those described for the 
smaller detachments engaged in the direct pursuit. The en- 
emy should be attacked whenever he is encountered. The 
leader can afford to give the minimum consideration to 
the safety of his command and the maximum attention to 
injuring the enemy. In this phase of the pursuit, cavalry 
will probably find use for all its methods of attack except 
that in which the men advance for considerable distances 
without using their horses. It is difficult to conceive of a 
situation when that kind of attack would be advisable. 
The action will consist chiefly of either the fire action of 
artillery, automatic arms and rifles, the mounted charge 
with pistols or sabers, or a combination of the two. It will 
seldom if ever, be advisable to send troops where they can 
not go mounted, that is to say, they must not dismount ex- 
cept where the horses can be kept close at hand. During 
the early stages of the pursuit before the enemy has suf- 
fered any considerable demoralization, the operations of 
the cavalry will consist principally of rapid movement 
mounted to a position from which an effective fire can be 
brought to bear upon the retreating enemy, then the deliv- 
ery of as hot a fire as possible, followed by a quick mount- 
ing up and dash for a similar position farther along in 
the direction in which the enemy is moving. As the retreat 
continues and the enemy becomes worse demoralized, oppor- 
tunities for a mounted charge will be more frequent. Fin- 
ally, if the retreat is turned into a rout it will be possible 
to charge almost at will into the mass of fugitives, and it 
is by these charges that the big results in the capture of 
prisoners and guns are obtained. If the enemy is able to 
continue his retreat in good order while furnishing rea- 
sonable protection for his marching columns, the pursuit 
may not have decisive results until the main force of the 
army cavalry, which has taken up the strategic pur- 



—109— 
suit, has succeeded in cutting off the retreat. The cavalry- 
engaged in the tactical pursuit may find it impossible to 
close with the enemy in a decisive manner until the in- 
fluence of the strategic pursuit is felt by the enemy. While 
boldness to the point of rashness is the rule a leader must 
not sacrifice his command if by so doing he will destroy the 
chances of success of the pursuit. 

The bulk of the army cavalry is usually assigned 
to the strategic pursuit under the immediate command of 
its own commander, who accompanies this part of his force. 
Before and during the battle he should have studied the 
maps of the country in rear of the enemy's lines, his sys- 
tem of communications with the rear (as furnished by 
army G2) and any other information obtainable, with a 
view to determining the enemy's most probable lines of 
retreat and to selecting the most favorable points or locali- 
ties for the operations of the army cavalry in rear 
of the hostile army. It is the duty of the army commander 
to designate the objectives of the army cavalry when there 
is time. In practice, these objectives will usually be decided 
upon in a conference between the army commander and the 
cavalry commander if there has been sufficient warning of 
a probable enemy withdrawal. Occasions might arise when 
it would become necessary for the cavalry commander to 
take up the strategic pursuit entirely on his own initiative. 
He should do this only when thoroughly conversant with 
the plans of the army commander, whom he must notify 
at once of his action. 

The objective of the strategical pursuit should be some 
point or locality which, if occupied by the cavalry, will have 
a decisive effect in capturing or destroying the hostile main 
army. For example — a river line across the enemy* s lines 
of retreat, defiles through which the enemy must pass, or 
a strong defensive position well in the enemy's rear. Lack- 
ing objectives that possess such obvious advantages, the 
bulk of the army cavalry may be directed toward the 
heads of the retreating columns or toward localities in which 
they are expected to arrive. 

At the start of the strategic pursuit,, the main considera- 
tion is speed, in order to reach the objective. The march 
is made by roads in general parallel to the enemy's line of 
retreat, where little resistance is apt to be met before reach- 



—110— 

ing the decisive locality. One of the duties of the hostile 
cavalry will be to stop or delay this strategic pursuit. If 
encountered, the hostile cavalry must be attacked and dis- 
persed or driven back. Failing in this, it should be con- 
tained by a portion of the force and the remainder used to 
overlap. Nothing must be permitted to interfere with the 
rapid advance. If practicable to do so, arrangements should 
be made to have infantry follow up, either in trucks or by 
marching, to seize positions along the lines of march and 
prevent the enemy from changing the direction of his re- 
treat. 

Having reached its objective, the further action of 
the cavalry will depend upon its specific mission. If it has 
been sent to hold the crossings of a stream or a defile, defen- 
sive action may be advisable at first; but even then, no 
opportunity should be overlooked to inflict losses upon the 
enemy by using a part of the force for offensive action. 

Pursuit should be continued with the utmost energy 
until complete disintegration of the enemy's force is accom- 
plished. 

When, by the various methods that have been described, 
the pursuit has succeeded in demoralizing the enemy, every 
man and every horse must be used to the full limit of endur- 
ance to complete the destruction of the hostile army. The 
only danger to the pursuing force lies in giving the enemy 
time to reform his units. It is at this stage of the pursuit 
that the mounted charge by units of all sizes will get the 
maximum results. The masses of fugitives must be 
charged again and again until the horses are completely 
exhausted or the enemy's force is entirely destroyed or 
captured. 

The commander-in-chief should be kept informed of 
the progress of the pursuit and the location and condition 
of the enemy's forces by messages from the cavalry com- 
mander. 

During the excitement of the pursuit, the natural 
tendency will probably be for the cavalry leaders to become 
so intent upon the work at hand that they will get entirely 
out of communication with the infantry commander in 
rear. The importance of teamwork in keeping the latter 
informed of the progress of the pursuit is obvious. Mes- 



—ill- 
sages should be sent by the most expeditious means available 
to inform the commander of the whole force of every im- 
portant development. 



In the foregoing discussion, the different phases of 
the pursuit have been discussed separately in an effort to 
bring out the principles to be followed in each kind of pur- 
suit. To make as clear cut a distinction as possible in the 
missions of the different pursuing bodies, the force involved 
was assumed to be a large army deployed on a long battle 
line, each corps having corps cavalry assigned and there 
being a large force of army cavalry on the flank. 

In a smaller force or in a force having less cavalry at 
its disposal, the division of duties would not be nearly so 
clearly defined. The tactical and strategical pursuit on lines 
parallel to the direction of the enemy's retreat might be 
merged into one. For example, the same body of cavalry 
might perform both functions by attacking the enemy re- 
peatedly in flank and gradually reaching a position in which 
his retreat could be completely blocked. The action of the 
cavalry assigned to the direct pursuit would consist prin- 
cipally in keeping contact directly in rear with a small 
force while it attacked the whole rear guard in flank. 

Whenever portions of the enemy endeavor to hold 
their ground they must be outflanked repeatedly. This 
constant overlapping must be kept up day and night, regard- 
less of the fatigue of men and horses. A pursuit thus 
carried to the utmost may save the army another battle 
and terminate the whole campaign. 

To repeat — The following principles probably, come 
as near to being general rules for the conduct of a pursuit 
as any that can be laid down : 

1. It is the duty of cavalry to devote every man it possesses 
to the pursuit and to press it without mercy, however tired its 
horses may be from previous fighting. 

2. Use only a small proportion of the cavalry to follow the 
enemy's retreat directly, and turn the flank of the rear guard 
in preference to attacking it in front. 

3. Outpace the beaten troops and attack them without 
intermission at several points at once, by artillery, rifle and ma- 
chine gun fire and by mounted charges, either singly or in com- 
bination. Direct the principal attacks at the main retreating 
columns. 



—112— 

4. Cut off the enemy's retreat altogether, if possible, by 
seizing some strong position that directly blocks the roads on 
which the enemy is retreating. 

5. Send a few troops to look for the enemy's trains, throw 
them into disorder and destroy them. 

6. If possible, arrange to have infantry supports follow up 
and hold important points to prevent the enemy from escaping 
laterally. 

7. Cavalry must not hesitate to subdivide its forces in the 
pursuit if necessary. The commander must explain to subordi- 
nates the general object to be attained and allow them to act on 
their own initiative. 



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